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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the Extravehicular Mobility
Unit System FMEA/CIL
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, I0 October 1986.
The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the
Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system,
generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential
critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was
accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within
the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then
compared to the most recent (upto December 31, 1987), proposed
Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each
discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional
analysis as required. This report documents the results of that
comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware.
The IOA product for the EMU independent analysis consisted of
four hundred and ninety-seven failure mode worksheets that
resulted in three hundred and ninety potential critical items.
A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL
baseline (undated, received October 1987) which consisted of 614
FMEAs and 474 CIL items. Differences between the number of IOA
worksheets and NASA FMEAs resulted from either different levels
of analysis (e.g. a subassembly versus a component) or due to the
failure mode not being identified within the original analysis.
Errors of omission by the IOA were corrected by additional
analysis whereas those within the NASA FMEA are identified
within this report for future correction.
All discrepancies resulting from the comparison were offered for
discussion however, due to NASA time constraints, only a limited
number of these discrepancies were discussed and only a small
portion of these resolved. The 153 issues identified in this
report with the NASA EMU subsystem manager (SSM); remain to be
resolved either by the NASA accepting them or rejecting them.
Figure 1 presents a comparison of the NASA FMEA with the IOA
final results and any remaining issues.
THe IOA also notes that the EMU secondary oxygen pack (SOP) is
now categorized as an emergency subsystem rather than a redundant
or back-up subsystem. This recategorization was recommended by
the IOA's initial EMU analysis report.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED4
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B.
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3.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) is an independent
anthropomorphic system that provides environmental protection,
mobility, life support, and communications for the Space Shuttle
crewmember to perform Extravehicular Activity (EVA) in Earth
orbit. EVA has been defined for EMU analysis considerations as
any time the EMU external environment pressure is below 4.0 psia.
A schematic of the EMU is provided in Figure 2.
The EMU has been designed to accommodate an EVA mission with a
total duration of 7 hours maximum, consisting of 15 minutes for
egress, 6 hours for useful EVA tasks, 15 minutes for ingress, and
a 30 minute reserve.
The EMU primarily consists of the Life Support System (LSS),
Space Suite Assembly (SSA), and the Caution and Warning System
(c&w).
I. Life Support Subsystem (LSS) - The LSS subsystem
provides the following for the suited crewmember:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Pressurization
Thermal control
Breathing oxygen
Display and control of critical system parameters
Humidity, odor, and contaminant control
Electrical power storage and distribution
Communications
The assemblies and hardware which make up the LSS are
described below.
o The Primary Life Support Subsystem (PLSS),
reference Figure 3, is an assembly which normally
provides the crewmember with oxygen for breathing,
ventilation, and pressurization and water for
cooling. Additionally, with respect to the IOA
analysis, the PLSS provides for the storage and
distribution of power throughout the EMU and for
the maintenance of the suit atmosphere.
The PLSS consists of oxygen bottles and water
tanks together with associated regulators, relief
valves, and plumbing. Also contained within the
PLSS are a water pump, an air circulation fan, a
sublimator used for water cooling, and a water
separator used to remove excess moisture from the
ventilation lines. Integral to the PLSS are
several sensors used by the Caution and Warning
System (CWS) in monitoring life support subsystem
function.
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oWithin the PLSS, the Contaminant Control Cartridge
(CCC) contains an activated charcoal bed for trace
gas removal, a LiOH bed for CO2 removal, and a
particulate filter to remove solid particles. The
CCC is installed in the back of the PLSS and is
replaceable in flight for EMU recharge.
EMU mission power requirements during EVA are
satisfied by the PLSS battery which stores and
provides the electrical power for the operation of
all electric components of the EMU, reference
Figure 4. The battery mounts into the back of the
PLSS, is replaceable in flight, and can be
recharged while installed in the PLSS.
The Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), reference Figure
5, is a functionally independent life support
system, providing the EMU with an emergency back-
up oxygen system for a minimum of 30 minutes. It
provides oxygen for suit loop backup pressure
regulation and an open loop oxygen purge for
removal of heat, CO2, and humidity in the event of
a loss of the primary function. The SOP is mounted
to the bottom of the PLSS and employs the same
oxygen delivery path as the PLSS. Due to the
numerous critical functions supported by the SOP,
its operation and hardware are discussed in detail
in the following paragraphs.
The SOP assembly contains two oxygen storage
pressure vessels, a two stage regulator, a dial-
type pressure gauge, a pressure transducer, and an
oxygen fill connector (for servicing the SOP
through Ground Servicing Equipment only).
Oxygen from the SOP is controlled by a two-stage
regulator. The second-stage regulator also acts
as the shutoff valve for this system. The second-
stage regulator is caged when the oxygen actuator
is in the OFF, IV, and PRESS positions. When the
oxygen actuator is placed in the EVA position, the
second-stage regulator is uncaged and oxygen is
allowed to flow as demanded. The second-stage
regulator also has a manual override that provides
for crewmember checkout of the SOP during Pre-EVA
operations.
The first-stage regulator reduces the nominal
supply pressure of approximately 6000 psig to an
interstage pressure of 240 to 280 psig. The
second-stage regulator further reduces the inter-
stage pressure to maintain the ventilation loop at
oo
3.33 to 3.55 psid over a flow range of 4.51 to
5.26 ib/hr, 3.33 to 3.9 psid over 1.01 to 4.5
Ib/hr, and 3.4 to 3.9 psid over 0.06 to 1 ib/hr.
If the second-stage regulator fails open, the
outlet of the regulator acts as a flow-limiting
orifice, limiting flow to 7.49 ib/hr, allowing the
suit relief valve to maintain suit pressure. The
second-stage regulator is designed to maintain
suit pressure with an upstream pressure equal to
full tank pressure.
Initiation of the SOP pressure make-up requires no
action by the crewmember. The SOP purge is used
to deliver oxygen or to remove co2, heat, and
humidity from the system and is initiated by the
crewmember manually opening the DCM purge valve.
In this manner, suit pressure is controlled to
3.33 to 3.9 psid and a maximum oxygen flow of 4.9
ib/hr is delivered from the SOP through the helmet
over the body, and then overboard via the purge
valve to remove CO2, heat, and humidity. A back-
flow check valve in the PLSS ventilation duct
helps direct all flow to the helmet.
If the purge is initiated by the crewmember
opening the helmet purge valve on the helmet.
Suit pressure is controlled from 3.33 to 3.9 psid
and a flow of 2.5 ib/hr is delivered through the
helmet. Flow in this mode is into the helmet
through the vent pad, over and around the
crewmember's head, and then out through the helmet
purge valve; no cooling is provided.
DCM - The Displays and Controls Module (Figure 6)
contains the visual displays and electrical and
mechanical controls required for operation of the
EMU by the EVA crewmember. Contained in the DCM
are the cooling control valve, the suite pressure
gauge, a purge valve, the SCU interface connector,
a significant portion of the EMU electrical
control electronics and switches, and the remote
actuator for oxygen regulators. The DCM mounts
directly to the front of the HUT.
SCU - The Service and Cooling Umbilical is a 12-ft
umbilical that consists of three water hoses, a
high-pressure oxygen hose, electrical wiring and
bacteria filters. The SCU supplies the PLSS with
electrical power, communications, oxygen, waste
water drainage, and water cooling from the Orbiter
during pre- and post-EVA operations. It also
supplies the EMU with recharge of the oxygen
tanks, water tanks, and battery.
i0
oThe vehicle end of the SCU consists of four ECLSS
connections and one electrical connector that
connects the SCU to the Orbiter service panel. The
connections are permanent and do not require
crewmember operation.
The common connector on the EMU end of the SCU
combines the four fluid and one electrical circuit
connector into a single connector operated by the
crewmember.
EVCS - The EMU radio is a UHF/AM transceiver
installed within the PLSS (reference Figure 3).
It provides the following basic functions.
o Duplex voice communications with another EVA
crewmember and the Orbiter
o Biomedical (ECG) Telemetry via a subcarrier
o A backup communications mode that provides
simplex voice-only communications between the
Orbiter and EVA crewmembers
Additionally, the radio provides audible caution
and warning tones when cued by the CWS to alert
the crewmember in the event of abnormal or unsafe
conditions.
The low profile, omnidirectional UHF antenna is
mounted in a pocket of the thermal cover on top of
the PLSS. It consists of three resonating cavity
antennas, one for each of the frequencies used.
ii
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• Space Suit Assembly (SSA) - The SSA, reference Figure
7, provides crewmember enclosure for all EVA
operations. Containment of the pressurized
environment, ventilation and cooling loop support,
crewmember mobility and crewmember visibility are the
primary functions provided by the SSA. The assemblies and
components comprising the SSA are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
o HUT and Arms: The hard upper torso includes
provisions for the attachment of the helmet/visor,
arms, lower torso, PLSS, and DCM. The upper torso
consists of a hard torso section, the upper half
of the waist ring, the lower half of the helmet
neck ring, and the TMG. Integral to the upper
torso structure is the channeling for both cooling
water circulation and ventilation oxygen
circulation. Each arm consists of an upper arm
and a lower arm connected by the arm bearing.
The upper arm includes the upper torso interfacing
scye bearing, a shoulder joint, a conformal
bladder, and a TMG. The lower arm includes the
glove interfacing wrist disconnect, an elbow
joint, a conformal bladder, and a TMG.
o LTA: The lower torso assembly provides coverage
for the crewmember from the waist down. It
includes a waist bearing, waist section, legs,
boots, boot soles, fabric restraint, bladder, and
TMG. The top of the lower torso is the lower half
of the waist ring, which provides space suit
assembly separation for donning, doffing and
support for the waist section and hip joints. The
redundant axial restraint system transmits loads
through all joints from the boots to the lower
half of the waist ring.
o Gloves: The EV glove provides protection from
both vacuum and temperature extremes for the
crewmember's hand. A conformal urethane bladder
provides pressure integrity while a polyester
cloth restraint system keeps the bladder from
deforming when pressurized• A multi-layer
insulation (MLI) thermal blanket covers the
bladder/restraint system with an Ortho fabric
outer layer over the MLI. An adjustable plam
restraint bar enables the crewmember to tighten
the glove palm area as required for hand mobility.
o Helmet/Visor Assembly: The helmet/visor consists
of the helmet bubble and the visor assembly, which
are permanently attached. The bubble is a clear
rigid pressure-retaining vessel made from UV-
stabilized polycarbonate material• Integral to
15
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•the helmet bubble are the helmet neck ring, which
attaches to the upper torso neck ring, and the
vent pad, which directs the oxygen flow to the
helmet over the crewmember's face for effective
carbon dioxide removal. The helmet purge valve is
located on the left side of the helmet.
The visor assembly protects the crewmember and
helmet from thermal and solar radiation. It
consists of visors, pivot and latch mechanisms,
center and side eyeshades, and supporting
structures for the visors and the shades. The
visors are fabricated from UV-stabilized
polycarbonate and polysulfane material with
thermal/optical coatings applied to the inner
surface•
o LCVG: The cooling garmet is a form-fitting
elastic garment worn against the crewmember's
body. The garment supports a network of tubing
that circulates cooling water over the body. It
also supports a network of ducting that draws
ventilating gas from suit extremities to complete
the suit ventilation loop. Connections to the
ducting in the HUT for both cooling water and vent
flows are made at the multiple connector.
o CCA: The comm cap is a fabric skull cap
encapsulating microphone and earphone electronic
modules.
o UCD: The male UCD is a rubberized fabric bladder
worn inside the cooling garmet around the waist
with a roll-on cuff for interfacing with the
crewmember. Urine contained in the UCD may be
dumped into the urine tube of the Waste Collection
System (WCS). The UCD can contain a maximum of 32
fluid ounces of urine.
Caution and Warning System (CWS) - The EMU caution and
warning system monitors system configuration,
environmental parameters, and consumables status. When
detected, faults are displayed to the crewmember
automatically. The crewmember can display suit
parameters and consumables status at any time. The
Shuttle EMU is independent of ground monitoring and
control.
The CWS microprocessor is the heart of the EMU CWS and
is located on the top side of the PLSS. This box
contains the central processing unit, the memory, the
analog to digital converters, and the latching relays
necessary to processing incoming sensor information and
providing it to the crewmember.
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3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The EMU interfaces with the Shuttle Orbiter airlock, its mission
equipment provisions, and the MMU.
The Orbiter airlock provides stowage for the EMU during launch,
orbit, and reentry by means of the EMU mount. The EMU mount
serves as the EMU donning and doffing station during EVA
preparation and post-EVA operations in the airlock. During EVA
prep and post activities, the EMU is connected to the Orbiter
Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem (ECLSS) in the
airlock by the SCU for airlock-supplied oxygen, cooling water,
communications, and power. Before a second EVA, the EMU is
connected to the Orbiter ECLSS by the SCU for EMU recharge.
During recharge, the EMU is stowed in the airlock on the EMU
mount which serves as a recharge station to permit simultaneous
water and oxygen charging, LiOH cartridge replacement, and
battery charging or replacement.
The EMU interfaces with crewmember restraint and translation
provisions in the airlock and cargo bay. These provisions
include handholds, handrails, foot restraints, and tether
attachment points.
The Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) provides the EVA crewmember a
free space maneuvering capability outside the Orbiter cargo bay.
The EMU latches to the MMU with the passive half of the latching
device provided by the PLSS. The MMU contains the active half of
the latching mechanism. Additionally, the MMU support station
provides restraints and handrails to aid the EVA crewmember in
donning and doffing the MMU.
3.3 Hierarchy
Due to the approach employed by the IOA, the EMU system was
analyzed in a hierarchal manner to ensure consistency in fault
path definition and in the identification of failure effects.
The top level hierarchy employed for EMU analysis considerations
is presented in Figure 8.
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the EMU hardware initially generated 497
failure mode worksheets and identified 390 Potential Critical
Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In order to
facilitate comparison, 169 additional failure mode analysis
worksheets were generated. These analysis results were compared
to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of (the most recent
available as of December 31, 1987). The discrepancy between the
number of IOA and NASA FMEAs can be explained by the different
approach used by NASA and IOA to identify failure modes or simply
by errors of omission. Errors of omission and incongruities in
analysis detail by the IOA were corrected by additional analyses
(reference appendix E). Fifty-three (53) failure modes were
identified by the IOA analysis that were not covered by the NASA
FMEAs. The IOA recommends the addition of all these failure
modes to the NASA FMEA baseline; however, only forty-two were
considered issues due to CIL impacts.
In the analysis report, the EMU was EVCS included as an area of
analysis; however, in the assessment report the EVCS has not been
included due to its incorporation into the IOA communications and
tracking report. Additionally, the IOA did not encompass
electrical power harnesses and connectors per the approval of the
IOA NASA task monitor.
With regard to the issues, the IOA has identified a total of one
hundred and fifty-three (153). Ninety (90) of these are
concentrated in the PLSS and the DCM. This was not unexpected
due to each subsystem's complexity and significant use of
redundancy. These features resulted in different levels of
analysis and in different determinations of redundancy by both
the IOA and the NASA. Another area of PLSS and DCM issues
resulted from differing usage of screen B detectability
requirements. The NASA established an interpretation that so
long as the crewmember could obtain safe haven upon detection the
screen would be passed; however, the IOA disagreed with the use
of an emergency system (the SOP) to support obtaining safe haven.
The largest remaining block of issues (40) are distributed
throughout the HUT, helmet, arm assemblies, glens, and the LTA.
Although many of these issues are similar in cause to those of
the PLSS and the DCM (namely different levels of analysis or
different interpretation of redundancy), a large group of these
resulted from a common failure mode - loss of pressure integrity.
The NASA would "qualify" the failure mode as loss of pressure
maintenance capability in excess of SOP make-up capability. The
IOA's concern was that it automatically assumed loss of the SOP
in assigning a i/i criticality; the IOA would prefer a 2/IR with
a failure of screen B and screen C to reflect the failure
scenario.
2O
The IOA also notes that the SOP has been determined to be an
emergency subsystem to the EMU. The IOA recommended the SOP to
be just that in the IOA analysis report issued in 1986.
In the following, the unmapped IOA column is the raw number of
IOA failure modes. The mapped IOA column is the number of IOA
failure modes after they have been mapped into the NASA FMEAs.
The issues column is the IOA failure modes that were unable to be
mapped onto NASA FMEAs.
IOA
EMU Unmapped Mapped NASA ISSUES
LSS (Total) 489 508 455 104
PLSS 225 227 217 48
SOP 30 33 31 5
SCU 38 41 37 4
DCM 178 189 156 42
C&W 18 18 14 5
SSA (Total) 172 180 159 49
HUT 34 35 28 12
Helmet 18 18 17 2
Arms 21 23 24 7
Gloves 20 21 20 6
LTA 44 46 41 13
LCVG 16 17 17 1
IBD, UCD, CCA 19 20 12 8
Total 661 688 614 153
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous
analysis results reported in Space Transportation System
Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No.
1.0-WP-VA86001-15, Analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit,
15 December 1986. Appendix F provides a cross reference between
the NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA
recommendations are also summarized therein.
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A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
I Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment I
I Component NASA IOA Issues I
4
LSS
PLSS
SOP
SCU
DCM
C&W
(Total)
SSA (Total)
HUT
Helmet
Arms
Gloves
LTA
LCVG
IDB, UCD, CCA
455
217
31
37
156
5O8
227
33
41
189
TOTAL
14
159
28
17
24
20
41
17
12
614
18
180
35
18
23
21
46
17
20
688
104
48
5
4
42
5
49
12
2
7
6
13
1
8
153
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A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
I
+.
I
Table II Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment
Component
LSS
PLSS
SOP
SCU
DCM
C&W
(Total)
NASA
365
189
27
33
102
14
IOA
413
205
28
37
126
17
SSA (Total)
HUT
Helmet
Arms
Gloves
LTA
LCVG
IDB, UCD, CCA
TOTAL
109
17
13
23
14
31
7
4
474
134
24
13
23
17
38
8
ii
547
Issues
22
8
14
18
5
1
1
3
7
1
4O
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Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
I Table III
Criticality:
LSS (Total)
PLSS
SOP
SCU
DCM
C&W
SSA (Total)
HUT
Helmet
Arms
Gloves
LTA
LCVG
IDB, UCD,CCA
I TOTAL
4
Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
i/1
25
5
20
I
8
3
1
1
2
1
I
I
2/IR
198
143
5
1
41
8
63
9
2
15
5
26
3
3
261
_Imllll.
2/2
146
37
3
36
61
9
56
i0
9
6
9
9
5
8
202
3/IR
41
22
i
m
19
4
1
1
1
i
1
I
I
45
3/2R
49
I0
2
2
35
9
1
3
1
1
m
3
58
3/3
43
9
3
2
28
36
8
2
I
3
8
9
6
7933
TOTAL
502
226
33
41
184
18
171
32
18
23
2O*
46
17
20
673
* Certain analyses by IOA for this item were deleted for
technical reasons.
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Of the failure modes analyzed, twenty-four were determined to be
potential critical items. A summary of the IOA recommended
critical items is presented in Table IV.
Table IV Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items
Criticality:
LSS (Total)
PLSS
SOP
SCU
DCM
C&W
1/1
25
5
20
2/IR
198
143
5
1
41
8
2/2
146
37
3
36
61
9
3/IR
28
16
l
I
12
3/2R
49
I0
2
2
35
SSA (Total)
HUT
Helmet
Arms
Gloves
LTA
LCVG
IDB, UCD, CCA
TOTAL 33
8
3
1
1
2
1
63
9
2
15
5
26
3
3
261
56
i0
9
6
9
9
5
8
202
3
1
l
1
1
l
l
31
9
1
3
l
1
1
l
I
20
TOTAL
413
205
28
37
126
17
134
24
13
23
17
38
8
ii
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The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
[ Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers I
I Component IOA ID Number I
I LSS
SSA
100-499, 700-799
601-699, 800-899
4.1 Assessment Results - PLSS
The PLSS Assessmetn encompassed two hundred and twenty-seven
(227) failure modes applicable to various PLSS components and
assemblies. Of this number, 48 were considered to be IOA issues
with the NASA analysis. As stated earlier, many of these issues
have resulted from different levels of analysis or different
determinations of redundancy and detectability.
Because no specific trend or "common thread" existed for these
issues (other than those previously mentioned), the IOA
25
recommends use of each individual assessment for evaluation by
the NASA.
4.2 ASSESSMENT RESULTS - SOP
The SOP assessment resulted in five (5) issues. One issue has
already been reviewed with NASA (new failure mode-blocked SOP
bottle inlet filter) and accepted as a i/I criticality. The
remaining typically result from different levels of analysis and
scenarios definition.
4.3 ASSESSMENT RESULTS - SCU
Three of the four SCU issues resulted from incomplete mission
scenario development by the NASA. The IOA believes their review
and incorporation by the NASA will result in more complete
mission profiles by the NASA. The remaining issue (IOA ID No.
349) is solely with the determination of mission impact.
4.4 ASSESSMENT RESULTS - DCM
One hundred and eighty-nine (189) failure modes were addressed in
thye IOA DCM assessment. Forty-two (42) of these were determined
to be issues with the NASA analysis. As with the PLSS, no
specific "common thread" is evident throughout a majority of
these issues except for differences in levels of analysis and
determinations of redundancy and detectability. Each of the DCM
issues should be reviewed and evaluated based an individual
merit.
4.5 ASSESSMENT RESULTS - CAUTION AND WARNING
Five Caution and Warning issues resulted from eighteen
assessments. Three of these are new failure modes identified by
the IOA (possibly due to different levels of analysis). The
remaining two issues recommend upgrades to existing NASA
criticalities to more appropriately reflect failure mode impacts.
4.6 ASSESSMENT RESULTS -SSA
One hundred and eighty failure modes were assessed by the IOA for
the SSA. Forty-nine (49) of these were determined to be issues.
These issues typically resulted from differences in failure mode
definition, redundancy identification, and screen B assignment.
As stated earlier, many of the SSA issues are related to loss of
pressure integrity. The NASA states for many of these that the
loss of pressure integrity is in excess of the SOP makeup
capability. However, the IOA believes this statement is valid
only if it is inherent to the failure mode for the identified
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causes. Since the IOA considers such a statement as an
assumption of SOP failure, the IOA recommended a 2/IR criticality
rather than the i/I typically assigned by the NASA.
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Reference documentation available from NASA was used in the
analysis• The documentation used included:
lo NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL),
October i0, 1986
. SVHS 7800, Extravehicular Mobility Unit Design and
Performance Requirements Specifications, Rev. M, (no date -
last date was Rev. L. 11-26-84)
• SVHS 10105, CWS Electronics, Design, and Performance
Requirements for SEMU Item 150, Rev. A, 5-25-84 (original)
• SVHS 7801, Environmental Control Equipment, Extravehicular
Mobility Unit, General Mechanical Specification for
Equipment, Rev. F, (no date)
. SVHS 7802, Space Shuttle Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)
System, General Electrical Requirements for, Rev. A, 3-11-77
(original)
• SVHS 7808, Specification: Shuttle EMU, SCU and DCM Common
Connector (Items 410 and 330), Rev. C, (no date)
• ICD-HSD-4-0001-0D-0, Space Shuttle EMU/MMU Section I
Electrical Interface Document, Rev. L, 2-8-85
• ICD-HSD-4-0008-OC, Space Shuttle EMU/EVC Interface Document,
Rev. G, 12-13-83
• SV791145, Display, Alphanumeric - Four Character; HSD, Rev.
A, 11-7-84
i0. SVSK93600, Schematic, Systems Shuttle EMU; HSD, Rev. U,
1-17-86
II. SVSK96170, Schematic, Electrical, DCM; HSD, Rev. B, 3-18-86
12. SV778872, Connector, Multiple; HSD, Rev. Y, 6-17-85
13. SV778596, Switch, Power Mode; HSD, Rev. D, 1-13-84
14. SVSK94600, Schematic, Electrical, DCM; HSD, Rev. AA, 8-10-83
15. SV769939, Valve, Temperature Control; HSD, Rev. K, 11-19-82
16. SV771887, Switch, Fan/CLIV; HSD, Rev. E. 11-19-84
17. SVSK 94002, EMU Wiring Block Diagram; HSD, Rev. N. 12-9-85
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19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
18. SVSK 107481, Caution and Warning System Block Diagram; HSD,
5-15-84
SV767794, Switch, Push to Talk; HSD, Rev. D, 1-24-84
SV767795, Switch, Feedwater Valve; HSD, Rev. F, 10-17-84
SV767792, Switch, Caution and Warning; HSD, Rev. F, 9-7-85
SV767786, Switch, Mode Selector; HSD, Rev. F, 1-24-84
SV767789-02, Battery; HSD, Rev. E, 2-11-86
SV767789-03, Battery; HSD, Rev. B, 9-26-84
SV778528, Sensor, Pressure, Primary Oxygen; HSD, Rev. C,
9-29-83
SV767788, Sensor, Differential Pressure; HSD, Rev. J,
4-1-85
27. 0101-I0001, Communications Carrier Assembly; ILC, Rev. N,
4-29-85
28. SV778873, Pressure Control Module - Primary; HSD, Rev. V,
11-17-84
29. SV789111, Swich, Sensitive, Hermetic; HSD, Rev. B, 5-27-86
30. SV785844, Relief Valve, Dual Mode - Oxygen Feedwater; HSD,
Rev. T, 12-20-84
31. SV771836, Check Valve and Vent Flow Sensor; HSD, Rev. AV,
11-19-84
32. SV787993, Motor, Brushless; HSD, Rev. M. 2-7-86
33. SV772277, Pump, Water; HSD, Rev. R, 8-6-85
34. SV787994, Fan/Separator/Pump Assembly; HSD, Rev. J, 2-7-86
35. SV769480, Valve, Pilot Actuated; HSD, Rev. N, 5-30-85
36. SV784996, Valve, Check; HSD, Rev. B, 4-27-83
37. SV778543, Filter, Pump Inlet; HSD, Rev. H, 7-17-85
38. SV767699, Valve, Check, Assembly; HSD, 9-6-77
39. SV769403, Valve, Relief Condensate Water; HSD, Rev. N,
5-16-85
40. SV784943, Trap, Gas; HSD, Rev. E, 10-30-84
41. SV769405, Valve, Relief, Water; HSD, Rev. J, 10-4-82
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42.
43.
44.
45.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
SV785860, Valve, Relief; HSD, Rev. H. 11-20-84
SV787036, Valve, Positive Relief; HSD, Rev. G, 12-14-84
SV85927, Valve, Negative Relief; HSD, Rev. A, 11-19-84
SV85970, Box Assy., Caution and Warning; HSD, Rev. N. 12-20-
85
SV784982, Valve, Isolation; HSD, Rev. F, 6-20-85
SV784998, Valve Assy., Coolant Isolation; HSD, Rev. E, 4-15-
85
SV784985, Valve, Coolant Relief; HSD, Rev. D, 12-4-82
ICD-HSD-4-0001-OD-0, EMU-MMU Interface (Section II); HSD,
Rev. L, 2-8-85
ICD-HSD-4-0008-OC, Figure 6, EVC Envelope Requirement; HSD,
Rev. G, 12-13-83
SV789152, Harness, Electrical Signal; HSD, Rev. R, 6-24-86
SV789151, Harness, Electrical Power, HSD, Rev. AD, 6-30-86
SV767710-07, Secondasry Oxygen Pack; HSD, Rev. V, 7-13-85
SV778475, Pressure Control Module, Secondary; HSD, Rev. T,
7-2-85
SV792294-01, Module, Display and Control; HSD, 6-27-86
SV767690-02, Harness, EMU, Electrical; HSD, Rev. F, 12-10-85
SV772910, Regulator, Pressure, Water Supply; HSD, Rev. L,
8-20-84
SV771717, Regulator, Condensate Water; HSD, Rev. M, 11-8-82
SV778865, Hose Assy., SCU; HSD, Rev. F, 8-15-84
SV767730-09, Umbilical, Service and Cooling; HSD, 8-8-85
SV767785, Potentiometer, Display Intensity; HSD, Rev. F,
2-22-84
SV767784, Potentiometers, Volume Control; HSD, Rev. F,
2-23-84
SV771763, Harness Assy., Electrical; HSD, Rev. ABH, 6-30-86
SV771749, Sheath Assy.; HSD, Rev. H. 2-8-84
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65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
SV778872, Connector, Multiple; HSD, Rev. Y, 6-17-86
SV787027, Purge Valve - DCM;p HSD, Rev. C, 10-9-85
SV792291, Electronic Assy., DCM; HSD, Rev. H, 6-21-86
SV785003, Connector, Electrical, SCU; HSD, 7-21-82
SV764255, Connector, Electrical, Circular; HSD, Rev. J,
8-30-78
SV789153, Harness, Electrical, Caution and Warning; HSD,
Rev. V, 6-30-85
SV779301, Manifold Assy., Oxygen, Water; HSD, Rev. F,
12-9-85
SV778540, Shear Plate Assy.; HSD, Rev. BU, 5-27-86
0102-82437-18, ILC Dover, Table of Operations,
Waterline/Vent Tube Assembly, 5-14-86
9693, Assembly Multiple Connector LCVS Side, Air-Lock, Inc.,
Rev. D, 3-17-83
9697, Assembly Three Hose Clamp, Air-Lock, Inc., Rev. D,
3-17-83
9357, Helmet-to-Suit Disconnect Assembly Suit Side, Air-
Lock, Inc., Rev. Q, 3-17-83
9715, Helmet Ventseal Assembly, Air-Lock, Inc., Rev. D,
3-17-83
0107-82568-09, Table of Operations, Vent Plenum
Assembly, ILC Dover, Rev. A, October 1985
0107-81057-19/20, Table of Operations, Boot/Leg
Vent Duct, ILC Dover, July 1986
0107-81060-08, Table of Operations, LCVG Hand
Vent/Arm Duct, ILC Dover, Rev. A, September 1985
0104-82403-29/30, Table of Operations, Pressure Boot
Assembly, ILC Dover, Rev. B, September 1985
9752, Boot Disconnect Assembly, Air-Lock, Inc., Rev. B,
5-16-83
9787, Assembly Body Seal Closure LTA Half (16" Inside), Air-
Lock, Inc., Rev. F, 5-16-83
0106-86059-01, Table of Operations, Palm Restraint Assembly,
Glove Modified, ILC Dover, Rev. IR, March 1986
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87.
88.
89.
90.
93.
94.
97.
0106-23421, Bar, Palm Restraint, ILC Dover, Rev. E, 6-27-83
9924, Wrist Disconnect Assembly Glove Side-Right Hand, Large
(3.680 ID), Air-Lock, Inc., Rev. C, 7-26-84
9814, Wrist Disconnect Assembly Suit SIDE-RH, Air-Lock,
Inc., Rev. F, 6-12-86
9782, Assembly SCYE Bearing, 8.710 Ball Circles Dia.,
Air-Lock, Inc., Rev. E
9813, Wrist Disconnect Assembly Suite Side-LH, Air-Lock,
Inc., Rev. F, 6-12-86
9819, Combination Purge Vent Assembly, Air-Lock, Inc.,
Rev. R, 5-17-83
9672, Helmet Assembly, Air-Lock, Inc., Rev. K, 9-23-82
9786, Body Seal Closure Hut Half, 16" Inside, Air-Lock,
Inc., Rev. D, 5-12-83
SV772302, Retainer and Inserts, Bearing Shoulder, HSD,
Rev. M, 1-10-80
SV772303, Support, Pivot-Shoulder Bearing, HSD, Rev. E,
7-9-82
0102-82438-15/16 Rev. A, ILC Dover, Rev. A, July 1985
9694, Assembly Multiple Connector, Hut Side, Air-Lock, Inc.,
Rev. J, 5-2-86
SV772375, Shell and Inserts, Large-Hard Torso, HSD, 10-9-78
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
AAP
BITE
CCA
CCC
COMM
CPU
CWS
C&W
DCM
EVCS
ECLSS
EMU
EVA
EVC
EVVA
EVCS
FM
GFE
HSD
HUT
IOA
IDB
IVA
LCVG
LiOH
LSS
LTA
MMU
OPS
PLSS
SCU
SOP
SSA
STS
UCD
Airlock Adapter Plate
Built-in Test Equipment
Communications Carrier Assembly
Contaminant Control Cartridge
Communication
Central Processing Unit
Caution and Warning System
Caution and Warning
Display and Control Module
Extravehicular Communications System
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Extravehicular Activity
Extravehicular Activity
Extravehicular Communicator
Extravehicular Visor Assembly
Extravehicular Communications System
Failure Mode
Government Furnished Equipment
Hamilton Standard
Hard Upper Torso
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Insuit Drink Bag
Intravehicular Activity
Liquid Cooling and Vent Garmet
Lithium Hydroxide
Life Support System
Lower Torso Assembly
Manned Maneuvering Unit
Operations
Primary Life Support Subsystem
Service and Cooling Umbilical
Secondary Oxygen Pack
Space Suite Assembly
Space Transportation System
Urine Collection Device
A-I

APPENDIX B
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B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSEI - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFfECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE {MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(oPs)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP__SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH pHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
i.
•
•
•
o
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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.•
•
•
i0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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B.3 EMU Ground Rules and Assumptions
I. The overall EMU mission will encompass both planned EVA
operations (typically two 2-man EVAs are available each
Orbiter mission) and unscheduled EVA operations
(typically reserved for Orbiter safety-critical EVA
tasks).
RATIONALE: Ensures analysis provides worst-case
mission impact.
t The inability of an EMU to perform an EVA or to satisfy
a six-hour EVA duration will be considered a mission
impact.
RATIONALE: A worst case scenario in which the EMU is
employed for prebreathe, or in which the
EVA is time critical (e.g. rescue of
stranded EVA crewmember), or in which the
EVA objectives require full EVA duration is
thus obtained for the IOA analysis.
B-6
APPENDIX C
DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
= NASA FMEA/CIL
= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-145
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
145
TEMPERATURE SENSOR & HARNESS (ITEM 139)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
C ] [ ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
ANALYSIS AND CIL. THE IOA EFFECTS SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO IDENTIFY
POSSIBLE LOSS OF DC/DC CONVERTER DUE TO CURRENT LIMITER OPENING.
IF ACCOMPANIED BY A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE CCC THE
CREWPERSON WOULD NOT BE WORNED OF HIGH C02 LEVEL. DISORIENTATION
AND LOSS OF LIFE COULD RESULT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-2
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-166
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
166
CONDENSATE H20 RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 134)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p3 IF] [P]
IN3 IN] IN]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE, AND
CRITICALITY, IN TO THE NASA ANALYSIS. THE IOA RECOGNIZES THAT
THE NASA DID ADDRESS CONTAMINATION AS CASUAL EVENT IN THE NASA
FMEA; HOWEVER, THE IOA BELIEVES THE FILTER FAILURE IS A CREDIBLE
FAILURE
MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-175
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
175
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 172)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THE ABOVE FAILURE MODE (SCREEN
BLOCKED) AND FINDINGS INTO THE NASA ANALYSIS. THE IOA BELIEVES
THE SCENARIO WILL BE THE SAME AS FOR A FAIL CLOSED VALVE AND
THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THE INCLUSION BE AS A CAUSE FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED CASE IN 172-FM2.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-177
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
177
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 172)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-195
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
195
CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE
MODE FROM THE IOA ANALYSIS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-202
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
202
CHECK VALVE AND VENT FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALTHOUGH THE NASA ADDRESSES A SHORT AS A CAUSE IN FMEA 121-FMI,
THE IOA DOES NOT CONSIDER IT SUFFICIENT TO REPRESENT A
CORRESPONDING FAILURE MODE. AS SUCH, THE IOA RECOMMENDS
INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA FMEA AND CIL.
ADDITIONALLY, THE
IOA EFFECTS SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO REFLECT POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE
DC/DC CONVERTER DUE TO THE CURRENT LIMITER OPERATING WITH THIS
SHORT. A SIMULTANEOUS LOSS OF THE C02 CONTROL FUNCTION CAN
RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-224
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
224
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM II3A)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AND ANALYSIS
INTO THE NASA FMEA AND CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-225
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
225
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM II3A)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL. ALSO, THE IOA ANALYSIS SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO
DELETE POSSIBLE LEAKAGE AS AN ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONAL FAILURE MODE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-226
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
226
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM II3A)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /!R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AND ANALYSIS TO
THE NASA FMEA AND CIL. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA ORIGINAL
CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT HAS BEEN CHANGED FROM 2/IR TO A 3/IR TO
REFLECT FURTHER REVIEW.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-304
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU
304
IST STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213B)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE (REGULATES
HIGH) AND FINDINGS INTO THE NASA FMEA AND CIL. A DISCUSSION OF
THIS FAILURE MODE WITH THE NASA SSM RESULTED IN AN AGREEMENT THAT
IT WOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO NASA FMEA 213B-FM3.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-319
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM :
EMU
319
SOP FILL PORT QD AND FILTER (ITEM 213F)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THE FAILURE MODE FOR
COMPLETENESS.
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-320
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
EMU
320
SOP FILL PORT QD AND FILTER (ITEM 213F)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] C N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FURTHER REVIEW BY THE IOA OF THIS FAILURE MODE INDICATES POSSIBLE
CREW LOSS IF HIGH VELOCITY OXYGEN FLOW OCCURS WHEN CONTAMINANTS
HAVE BEEN PASSED BY THE FILTER. THIS RESULTS IN A HARDWARE "2"
CRITICALITY. ALSO, IF AND THE CONTAMINATION RESULTS IN
FAILURE OF THE 213B OR D REGULATORS, CREW LOSS COULD RESULT;
THEREFORE A FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY OF "IR" IS ALSO RECOMMENDED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-321
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
321
SOP ASSEMBLY (ITEM 200)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ p ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SUBSEQUENT TO DISCUSSIONS WITH AND IN AGREEMENT WITH THE NASA
SSM, THE IOA HAS UPGRADED CRITICALITY DUE TO POSSIBLE
HEATING/FIRE FROM FILTER RUPTURE CAUSING LOSS OF LIFE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-342
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
EMU
342
CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-360
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
360
SUIT PRESSUREGAGE (ITEM 311)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE FROM THE IOA
ANALYSIS DUE TO FURTHER REVIEW REVEALING THE SCENARIO AS NON-
CREDIBLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-361
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
361
SUIT PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 311)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AND ANALYSIS
INTO THE NASA FMEA. (NOTE: THIS FAILURE MODE IS INDICATED AS A
"CAUSE" FOR NASA FMEA 311-FM3).
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-384
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
384
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AND CRITICALITY
INTO THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-385
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
EMU
385
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA HAS REVIEWED ITS ORIGINAL ANALYSIS AND HAS DETERMINED THE
SOP TO BE NON-REDUNDANT TO THIS FUNCTION. THEREFORE, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AND ITS ANALYSIS
REFLECTING A 3/2R CRITICALITY INTO THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-386
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
386
COMMONMULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON ADDITIONAL REVIEW, THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS
FAILURE MODE AT A 3/3 CRITICALITY INTO THE NASA FMEA. THIS WILL
REFLECT A NON-CRITICAL IMPACT TO IV OPERATIONS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-387
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
EMU
387
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL. A FURTHER REVIEW OF THE ANALYSIS INDICATED A 2/IR
CRITICALITY WAS NOT JUSTIFIABLE AND THE FINAL CRITICALITY OF 2/2
WAS JUSTIFIABLE. THE FINAL CRITICALITY AND ANALYSIS WAS
REVIEWED AND AGREED TO BY THE NASA SSM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-394
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
394
VOLUMECONTROL (ITEM 360)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] C P ] [ F ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AND CRITICALITY
INTO THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-395
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
395
VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOGNIZES THE INCORPORATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IN NASA
FAILURE MODES 360-FMI AND -FM5 AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THAT
INCORPORATION.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-23
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-428
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
428
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE MODE NON-
CREDIBLE AND REQUIRES NO FURTHER ACTION UPON IT AND RECOMMENDS
ITS DELETION.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-24
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-439
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
439
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE (CLIV POWER
"OPEN" LINE/CONTACT OPEN) INTOTHE NASA FMEAAND CIL. THE
CRITICALITY HAS BEEN UPDATED TO REFLECT CONSISTENCY RELATIVE TO
NASA FMEA 366-FM6 WHICH THE IOA HAS ASSESSED AND CONCURRED WITH.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-440
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
440
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
CX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE
NASA FMEA AND CIL. THE CRITICALITY HAS BEEN UPDATED TO REFLECT
CONSISTENCY RELATIVE TO NASA FMEA 366-FM5 WHICH THE IOA HAS
ASSESSED AND CONCURRED WITH.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-442
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
442
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE IS A DUPLICATION OF MDAC ID 438, THEREFORE, IT
IS NOT APPLICABLE AND SHOULD BE DELETED.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-460
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
460
ALPHANUMERICDISPLAY (ITEM 369)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS IOA ANALYSIS WAS ORIENTED TO AN LED DISPLAY VERSUS THE LCD
WHICH IS NOW WHAT THE DCM DISPLAY WILL BE. THEREFORE THIS IOA
ANALYSIS IS NO LONGER APPLICABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-461
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
461
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA HAS UPGRADED ITS CRITICALITY
TO ENSURE CONSISTENCY WITH THE "LOSS OF DISPLAY" ANALYSIS WHICH
IDENTIFY A POSSIBLE, SUBSEQUENT CO2 CONTROL FAILURE AS
CAUSE FOR LOSS OF LIFE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-29
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-463
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
463
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THE FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA HAS UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY
TO REFLECT POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE WITH A CONCURRENT C02 CONTROL
FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-30
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-464
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
464
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
C ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THE FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA HAS UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY
TO REFLECT POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO A CONCURRENT CO2 CONTROL
FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-31
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-468
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
468
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE NASA INCLUDE THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE
FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-32
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-476
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
EMU
476
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-33
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-478
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU
478
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[ P ] C P ] C P ]
[N] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FALIURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-34
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-479
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
479
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-35
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-480
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
480
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /ZR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-36
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-485
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
485
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEAAND CIL. THE IOA ALSO RECOGNIZES THAT THE MISSION CAN
CONTINUE IF SUFFICIENT LIGHTING WERE AVAILABLE TO READ THE
DISPLAY; HOWEVER, THE WORST CASE WOULD ASSUME THERE IS NOT
SUFFICIENT
LIGHTING.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-37
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-486
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
486
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL. THE IOA HAS UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY TO REFLECT A
POSSIBLE CONCURRENT C02 CONTROL FUNCTION FAILURE WHICH CAN RESULT
IN LOSS OF LIFE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-38
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-487
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
487
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEAAND CIL. THE IOA HAS UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY TO REFLECT A
POSSIBLE CONCURRENT C02 CONTROL FUNCTION FAILURE WHICH CAN RESULT
IN LOSS OF LIFE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-39
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-488
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
488
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL. THE IOA WOULD ALSO MODIFY THE EFFECTS TO IDENTIFY
A POSSIBLE CONCURRENT CO2 CONTROL FUNCTION FAILURE WHICH CAN
RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-40
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-496
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 496
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE NASA
FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-41
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-509
EMU
509
EVC
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] IN]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE DETAILED ANALYSES AND ASSESSMENTS FOR THE EMU EVC SHOULD BE
IN THE IOA COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING (C&T) REPORTS. HOWEVER,
DUE TO AN ERROR OF OMISSION DURING THE C&T ANALYSIS, THE EVC WAS
NOT ENCOMPASSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE NASA FMEAs WERE FOUND TO
BE UNAVAILABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-42
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-510
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 510
ITEM: EVC
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE DETAILED ANALYSES AND ASSESSMENTS FOR THE EMU EVC SHOULD BE
IN THE IOA COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING (C&T) REPORTS. HOWEVER,
DUE TO AN ERROR OF OMISSION DURING THE C&T ANALYSIS, THE EVC WAS
NOT ENCOMPASSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE NASA FMEAs WERE FOUND TO
BE UNAVAILABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-43
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
EMU-511 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 511
ITEM: EVC
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE DETAILED ANALYSES AND ASSESSMENTS FOR THE EMU EVC SHOULD BE
IN THE IOA COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING (C&T) REPORTS. HOWEVER,
DUE TO AN ERROR OF OMISSION DURING THE C&T ANALYSIS, THE EVC WAS
NOT ENCOMPASSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE NASA FMEAs WERE FOUND TO
BE UNAVAILABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-44
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-512
EMU
512
EVC
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE DETAILED ANALYSES AND ASSESSMENTS FOR THE EMU EVC SHOULD BE
IN THE IOA COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING (C&T) REPORTS. HOWEVER,
DUE TO AN ERROR OF OMISSION DURING THE C&T ANALYSIS, THE EVC WAS
NOT ENCOMPASSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE NASA FMEAs WERE FOUND TO
BE UNAVAILABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-45
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
EMU-513 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 513
ITEM: EVC
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE DETAILED ANALYSES AND ASSESSMENTS FOR THE EMU EVC SHOULD BE
IN THE IOA COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING (C&T) REPORTS. HOWEVER,
DUE TO AN ERROR OF OMISSION DURING THE C&T ANALYSIS, THE EVC WAS
NOT ENCOMPASSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE NASA FMEAs WERE FOUND TO
BE UNAVAILABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-46
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-514
EMU
514
EVC
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE DETAILED ANALYSES AND ASSESSMENTS FOR THE EMU EVC SHOULD BE
IN THE IOA COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING (C&T) REPORTS. HOWEVER,
DUE TO AN ERROR OF OMISSION DURING THE C&T ANALYSIS, THE EVC WAS
NOT ENCOMPASSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE NASA FMEAs WERE FOUND TO
BE UNAVAILABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-47
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-515
EMU
515
EVC
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE DETAILED ANALYSES AND ASSESSMENTS FOR THE EMU EVC SHOULD BE
IN THE IOA COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING (C&T) REPORTS. HOWEVER,
DUE TO AN ERROR OF OMISSION DURING THE C&T ANALYSIS, THE EVC WAS
NOT ENCOMPASSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE NASA FMEAs WERE FOUND TO
BE UNAVAILABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-48
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-516
EMU
516
EVC
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
IN] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ J [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE DETAILED ANALYSES AND ASSESSMENTS FOR THE EMU EVC SHOULD BE
IN THE IOA COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING (C&T) REPORTS. HOWEVER,
DUE TO AN ERROR OF OMISSION DURING THE C&T ANALYSIS, THE EVC WAS
NOT ENCOMPASSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE NASA FMEAs WERE FOUND TO
BE UNAVAILABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-49
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-517
EMU
517
ANTENNA
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE DETAILED ANALYSES AND ASSESSMENTS FOR THE EMU EVC SHOULD BE
IN THE IOA COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING (C&T) REPORTS. HOWEVER,
DUE TO AN ERROR OF OMISSION DURING THE C&T ANALYSIS, THE EVC WAS
NOT ENCOMPASSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE NASA FMEAs WERE FOUND TO
BE UNAVAILABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-50
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-604
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
604
WATER LINE AND VENT TUBE ASSMEBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
ANALYSIS AT A 2/2 CRITICALITY TO REFLECT DEGRADED COOLING EFFECTS
ON MISSION.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-51
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-612
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
612
HARD UPPER TORSO SHELL
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL. THE IOA WOULD ADD CAUSES OF CONTAMINATION AND BENT
PINS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-52
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-616
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
616
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (HUT SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE
MODE FROM THE IOA ANALYSIS DUE TO ITS BEING NON CREDIBLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-53
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-617
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
617
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (HUT SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE
MODE FROM THE IOA ANALYSIS DUE TO ITS BEING NON CREDIBLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-54
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-618
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
618
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (HUT SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ F ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE
MODE FROM THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS HAS BEEN
DETERMINED NON-CREDIBLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-55
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-675
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 675
ITEM: ROLLON CUFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] [ ] *
[ ] [x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-56
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-676
EMU
676
VALVE
J. WHITMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-57
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-677
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 677
ITEM: BLADDER
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
C ] [ ] *
C ] CX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-58
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-678
EMU
678
BLADDER
J. WHITMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-59
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-679
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 679
ITEM: HARNESS
LEAD ANALYST : J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-60
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-680
EMU
680
CCA
J. WHITMAN
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA AND CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-61
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-681
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 681
ITEM: CCA
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] C ] *
C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-62
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-742X
EMU
742
SHEATH ASSEMBLY (ITEM 428)
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] [N] [N]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-63
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-803X
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
803
NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/2R CRITICALITY TO ACCOUNT FOR POSSIBLE
MISSION IMPACTS FROM HOT/COLD SPOTS WHICH CAN RESULT FROM THE
LOOSE TMG IN THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-64
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-805X
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
805
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (HUT HALF)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY TO REFLECT POSSIBLE MISSION
IMPACTS RESULTING FROM HOT/COLD SPOTS WHICH MAY ACCOMPANY THIS
FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-65
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-813X
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
EMU
813
UPPER/LOWER ARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY THAT HOT/COLD SPOTS COULD
RESULT IN SUFFICIENT CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT TO CAUSE MISSION
TERMINATION. THE IOA THEREFORE RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-66
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-820X
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
820
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA CONSIDERED POSSIBLE HOT/COLD SPOTS AS CANDIDATES FOR
CAUSING SUFFICIENT CREW DISCOMFORT THAT THE MISSION IS
TERMINATED. THE IOA THEREFORE RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY AND
INCLUSION IN THE FMEA AND CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-67
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-825X
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
825
WAIST RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BECAUSE LOSS OF AXIAL RESTRAINT CAN RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT
CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT DUE TO EXERTION TO OVERCOME THE RESULTANT
DEFORMATION, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY TO REFLECT
POSSIBLE MISSION IMPACT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-68
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-826X
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
826
WAIST RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PROBABLE HOT/COLD SPOTS CAN RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT CREWPERSON
DISCOMFORT AND MISSION TERMINATION. THE IOA, THEREFORE,
RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION IN THE CIL FOR THIS
FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-69
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-829X
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
829
LOWERTORSORESTRAINT/BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY THAT HOT/COLD SPOTS CAN RESULT
IN SIGNIFICANT CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT AND MISSION TERMINATION.
THE IOA, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION IN
THE CIL FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-70
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-834X
EMU
834
PRESSUREBOOT ASSEMBLY
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE NASA
FMEA/CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EMU-784X
100-FMI
EMU
784
PLSS
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[p] [F]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[ F ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR BC CRITICALITY TO REFLECT THAT THIS
BRACKET IS ONE OF TWO WHICH IF BOTH WERE LOST CAN RESULT IN
SEPARATION OF HUT FROM PLSS AND UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-72
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-785X
NASA FMEA #: 100-FM2
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 785
ITEM: PLSS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-73
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
EMU-786X
100-FM3
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 786
ITEM: PLSS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
UPON FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-74
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU-787X
100-FM4
EMU
787
PLSS
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-75
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
EMU-840X
101-FMI
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 840
ITEM: CCA
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
C P ] [ P ]
[P] CP]
C ] [ ]
C
CP]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-76
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-842X
NASA FMEA #: 101-FMI
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 842
ITEM: CCA
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
EMU-841X BASELINE [ ]
101-FM2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 841
ITEM: CCA
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [p] [p]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA RECOMMENDS A
3/3 CRITICALITY DUE TO NO MISSION OR CREWPERSON IMPACT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-868X
NASA FMEA #: 101-FM3
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 868
ITEM: CCA
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT
[ l
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-79
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 869
ITEM: CCA
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
EMU-869X
101-FM4
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-80
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 870
ITEM: CCA
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
EMU-870X
101-FM5
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-81
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
EMU-601
102-FMI
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
601
NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
J. WHITMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-82
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-611
NASA FMEA #: 102-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
611
HARD UPPER TORSOSHELL
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA BELIEVES SUCH
A FAILURE MUST FIRST RESULT IN LOSS OF PLSS FUNCTION THEN LOSS OF
SOP FUNCTION TO CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE. BECAUSE THE DEFINED FAILURE
DOES NOT ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE LOSS OF PLSS AND SOP BUT
RATHER THEIR LOSS AS A FUNCTION OF FAILURE SESVERITY DEFINITION.
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY AND FAILURE OF SCREEN C TO
INDICATE THE LOSS OF LIFE SCENARIO.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-83
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /1 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU-846X
102-FMII
EMU
846
HARD TORSO SHELL
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-84
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-847X
NASA FMEA #: 102-FMI2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 847
ITEM: HARD TORSO SHELL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-85
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-848X
NASA FMEA #: 102-FMI3
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 848
ITEM: HUT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
IN] IN] IN] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA ASSUMED THE WORST CASE WHERE THE DISLODGED ITEM POSITIONS
ITSELF IN A MANNER WHICH IMPAIRS CREWPERSON VISION OR MOBILITY.
THE IOA THEREFORE RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION IN
THE CIL FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-86
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-849X
NASA FMEA #: 102-FMI4
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 849
ITEM: HUT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
IN] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-87
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-804X
NASA FMEA #: 102-FMI5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
804
WATER LINE AND VENT TUBE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
EMU-605
102-FMI6
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
605
WATER LINE AND VENT TUBE ASSMEBLY
J. WHITMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-89
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-606
NASA FMEA #: 102-FMI7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
6O6
WATER LINE AND VENT TUBE ASSMEBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-90
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-615
NASA FMEA #: 102-FMI8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
615
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (HUT SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[p] [p] IF]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA BELIEVES SUCH
A FAILURE MUST FIRST RESULT IN LOSS OF PLSS FUNCTION THEN LOSS OF
SOP FUNCTION TO CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE. BECAUSE THE DEFINED FAILURE
DOES NOT ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE LOSS OF PLSS AND SOP
FUNCTIONS, BUT RATHER THEIR LOSS AS A FUNCTION OF FAILURE
SEVERITY DEFINITION. THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY AND
FAILURE OF SCREEN C TO INDICATE THE APPLICABLE SCENARIO.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-91
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-806X
NASA FMEA #: 102-FMI9
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
806
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] IX]*
] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-92
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-600
NASA FMEA #: 102-FM2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
600
NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
J. WHITMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-93
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
EMU-613
102-FM20
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 613
ITEM: GIMBAL ASSY.
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
J. WHITMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-94
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-614
NASA FMEA #: 102-FM21
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 614
ITEM: BELLOWS ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA BELIEVES SUCH
A FAILURE MUST FIRST RESULT IN LOSS OF HTE PLSS AND THEN THE LOSS
OF THE SOP FUNCTION TO CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE. BECAUSE THE DEFINED
FAILURE DOES NOT ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE LOSS OF PLSS OF SOP
FUNCTIONS, BUT RATHER THEIR LOSS AS A FUANCTION OF FAILURE
SEVERITY DEFINITION. THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY AND
FAILURE OF SCREEN C TO INDICATE THE APPLICABLE SCENARIO.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-95
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/I0/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-610 BASELINE [ ]
102-FM22 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
610
MULTIPLE WATER CONNECTOR (HUT HALF)
J. WHITMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-96
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-607
NASA FMEA #: I02-FM23
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
607
MULTIPLE WATERCONNECTOR(HUT HALF)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-97
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-610A
NASA FMEA #: I02-FM24
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
610
MULTIPLE WATER CONNECTOR (HUT HALF)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BECAUSE THE IOA EMCOMPASSED BOTH H20 AND 02 LEAKAGE IN ONE
ANALYSIS AND THE NASA SEPARATED THEM IN A MANNER ACEPTABLE TO JSC
22206, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FINDINGS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-98
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-608
NASA FMEA #: I02-FM25
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
6O8
MULTIPLE WATER CONNECTOR (HUT HALF)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS FOR THE EVA PHASE; HOWEVER,
THE IOA ANALYSIS BELIEVES A FAILURE TO NOTE DURING THE PRE-EVA
PHASE (DUE TO MATERIAL IN THE MECHANISM OR A MATERIAL FAILURE)
WILL RESULT IN A 2/2 CRITICALITY DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM
THE MISSION
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-99
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-609
NASA FMEA #: I02-FM26
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
609
MULTIPLE WATERCONNECTOR(HUT HALF)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALTHOUGH DOFFING WITH THE MWC ENGAGED HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED, THE
IOA RECOGNIZED THE PROCEDURE AS A CONTINGENCY PROCEDURE WHICH
CANNOT BE USED TO DOWNGRADE A CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-100
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-619
NASA FMEA #: I02-FM27
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
619
HARNESS STRAP AND HARNESS PAD ASSMEBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-101
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
EMU-851X BASELINE [ ]
I02-FM28 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 851
ITEM: HUT TMG
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMPARE [ N /N ]
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
IN] IN] IN] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY THAT HOT/COLD SPOTS COULD
CAUSE SIGNIFICANT CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT AND CAUSE MISSION
TERMINATION. THE IOA, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY
AND INCLUSION IN THE CIL FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I02
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-602
NASA FMEA #: 102-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
602
NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA BELIEVES THE
PLSS AND THE SOP ARE REDUNDANT TO EACH OTHER AND MUST EACH BE
FAILED FUNCTIONALLY FOR LOSS OF LIFE TO RESULT. ADDITIONALLY,
THE IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN C TO INDICATE THE
POSSIBILITY THAT A SINGLE EVENT MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF THE PLSS
AND SOP FUNCTIONS. THE IOA, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDS A 2/IRC
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I03
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-801X
NASA FMEA #: 102-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
801
NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I04
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-802X
NASA FMEA #: 102-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
802
NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDS A HAZARD
ANALYSIS TO REVIEW IMPACTS OF A LOOSE SCREW IN THE EMU.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I05
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-603
NASA FMEA #: 102-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
603
NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS. HOWEVER, THE IOA WOULD
ALSO RECOMMEND FAILURE OF SCREEN C TO REFLECT POSSIBILITY THAT
THE CASUAL EVENT (E.G. IMPACT) WHICH REUSLTS IN FAILURE OF ONE
LATCH MECHANISM CAN CAUSE FAILURE OF THE OTHERS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I06
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-843X
NASA FMEA #: 102-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 843
ITEM: HARD TORSO SHELL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I07
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /1R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU-844X
102-FM8
EMU
844
HARD TORSO SHELL
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I08
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-845X
NASA FMEA #: 102-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 845
ITEM: HARD TORSO SHELL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I09
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-629
NASA FMEA #: 103-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
629
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [F]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA BELIEVES THE
PLSS AND THE SOP ARE REDUNDANT TO EACH OTHER AND MUST EACH BE
FAILED FUNCTIONALLY FOR LOSS OF LIFE TO RESULT. ADDITIONALLY,
THE IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN C TO INDICATE THE
POSSIBILITY THAT A SINGLE EVENT MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF THE PLSS
AND THE SOP FUNCTIONS. THE IOA, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDS A 2/iRc
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-ll0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-632
NASA FMEA #: 103-FMI0
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
632
ARM BEARING ASSEMBLY
J. WHITMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-Ill
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-816X
NASA FMEA #: 103-FMII
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU
816
ARM BEARING ASSEMBLY
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS "
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR SCREEN B. THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE FAILED ITEM IS NOT
STANDBY REDUNDANT BUT ONLY TRANSFERS THE FUNCTION TO A STANDBY
REDUNDANT ITEM.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-865X
NASA FMEA #: 103-FMI2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
865
ARM BEARING ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-628A
NASA FMEA #: 103-FMI3, FMI4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
628
UPPER/LOWER ARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B DUE TO THE ITEM FAILING IS NOT
STANDBY REDUNDANT AND ITS FAILURE NOT READILY DETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-i14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-627A
NASA FMEA #: 103-FMI5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
627
UPPER/LOWER ARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA BELIEVES THE
PLSS AND THE SOP TO BE REDUNDANT AND EACH MUST FAIL TO CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA SUGGESTS FAILING SCREEN C TO
REFLECT SCENARIO WHERE A SINGLE EVENT CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF
REDUNDANCIES. THE IOA THEREFORE RECOMMENDS A 2/iRc CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-866X
NASA FMEA #: 103-FMI6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
866
LOWER ARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-817X
NASA FMEA #: 103-FMI7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 817
ITEM: WRIST DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [_] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B.
THE IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE ITEM THAT
FAILS IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE AND IS NOT STANDBY REDUNDANT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-818X
NASA FMEA #: 103-FMI8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 818
ITEM: WRIST DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I18
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-635
NASA FMEA #: 103-FMI9
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 635
ITEM: WRIST DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[p] [p] IF]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA BELIEVES THE
PLSS AND THE SOP TO BE EXISTING REDUNDANCIES WHICH MUST EACH FAIL
TO RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA SUGGESTS SCREEN
C BE FAILED TO INDICATE POSSIBLE LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES DUE
TO A SINGLE EVENT. THE IOA, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDS A 2/iRc
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-I19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
EMU-871X
103-FM2
EMU
871
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
C ]
C ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-120
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-634
NASA FMEA #: 103-FM20
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 634
ITEM: WRIST DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-121
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-633
NASA FMEA #: 103-FM21
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 633
ITEM: WRIST DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-122
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-636
NASA FMEA #: I03-FM22
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 636
ITEM: WRIST DISCONNECT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-123
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-852X
NASA FMEA #: I03-FM23
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 852
ITEM: ARM TMG
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
IN] IN] IN] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA CONSIDERED THE POSSIBLITY OF THE LOCAL HOT/COLD SPOTS
CAUSING SIGNIFICANT CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT SUCH THAT THE MISSION
COULD BE TERMINATED. THE IOA, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDS A 2/2
CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION IN THE CIL FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-124
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
EMU-872X BASELINE [ ]
103-FM2A NEW [ X ]
EMU
872
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH
THE REMAINDER OF THE ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-125
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-815X
NASA FMEA #: 103-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
815
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLI GHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [P] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-126
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-630
NASA FMEA #: 103-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
630
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-127
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-627
NASA FMEA #: 103-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
627
UPPER/LOWERARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x] *
Ix]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA BELIEVES THE
PLSS AND SOP ARE REDUNDANT TO EACH OTHER AND MUST EACH BE FAILED
FUNCTIONALLY FOR LOSS OF LIFE TO RESULT. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN C TO INDICATE THAT A SINGLE
EVENT MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF THE PLSS AND THE SOP FUNCTIONS. THE
IOA, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDS A 2/iRc CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-128
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-628
NASA FMEA #: 103-FM6, FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
628
UPPER/LOWER ARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.
AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B.
[ ]
[ ]
THE IOA
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-129
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-814X
NASA FMEA #: 103-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
814
UPPER ARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE FABRIC RESTRAINT,
UNLIKE THE BLADDER, IS NOT STANDBY REDUNDANT AND IS NOT READILY
DETECTABLE WHEN FAILED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-631
103-FM9
EMU
631
ARM BEARING ASSEMBLY
J. WHITMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA BELIEVES THE
PLSS AND THE SOP ARE REDUNDANT TO EACH OTHER AND MUST EACH FAIL
IN LOSS OF LIFE TO RESULT. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA RECOMMENDS
FAILURE OF SCREEN C TO INDICATE THE POSSIBILITY THAT A SINGLE
EVENT MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF THE PLSS AND SOP FUNCTIONS. THE IOA,
THEREFORE, RECOMMENDS A 2/iRc CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-658
NASA FMEA #: 104-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM :
EMU
658
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (LTA SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA CONSIDERS THE
PLSS AND SOP AS REDUNDANT AND THAT EACH MUST FAIL TO RESULT IN
LOSS OF LIFE. ADDITIONALLY, TO REFLECT THE SCENARIO WHERE A
SINGLE CAUSE CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF BOTH REDUNDANCIES, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A 2/iRc CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-824X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
824
WAIST RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-647
104-FMII
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
647
WAIST RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
J. WHITMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B.
THE IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B DUE TO THE FAILED ITEM NOT
BEING STANDBY REDUNDANT AND NOT BEING READILY DETECTABLE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-874X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FMI2
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 874
ITEM: WAIST BEARING
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH
THE REMAINDER OF THE ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-648
NASA FMEA #: 104-FMI3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 648
ITEM: WAIST BEARING
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_L_RKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA CONSIDERS THE
PLSS AND THE SOP AS REDUNDANCIES WHICH MUST FAIL TO RESULT IN
LOSS OF LIFE. BECAUSE A SINGLE EVENT (CAUSE) CAN RESULT IN LOSS
OF BOTH REDUNDANCIES, THE IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN C
AND A 2/IR CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-875X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FMI4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 875
ITEM: WAIST BEARING
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /F ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR SCREEN C. THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN C DUE TO LIKE HARDWARE BEING
SUSCEPTIBLE TO A COMMON CAUSE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
EMU-876X BASELINE [ ]
104-FMI5 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 876
ITEM: WAIST BEARING
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH
THE REMAINDER OF THE ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-877X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FMI6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 877
ITEM: WAIST BEARING
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH
THE REMAINDER OF THE ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-878X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FMI7
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 878
ITEM: WAIST BEARING
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA IS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE NASA FMEA EXCEPT FOR
SCREEN C. IOA BELIEVES A CREDIBLE COMMON CAUSE SUCH AS IMPACT OR
CORROSION CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF BOTH THE PIN AND THE SECONDARY
RESTRAINT BRACKET.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-879X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FMI8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 879
ITEM: WAIST BEARING
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B BUT NOT SCREEN C. THE IOA
BELIEVES A CREDIBLE COMMON CAUSE CAN FAIL BOTH THE REAR RESTRAINT
AND SECONDARY RESTRAINT BRACKET SCREWS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-880X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FMI9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 880
ITEM: WAIST BEARING
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
EMU-873X
104-FM2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
873
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (LTA SIDE)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
B
[ NA]
[ F ]
[ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B.
ANALYSIS IS IN AGREEMENT.
THE REMAINDER OF THE
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-827X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM20
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 827
ITEM: WAIST BEARING
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-649
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM21
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 649
ITEM: WAIST BEARING
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-650
NASA FMEA #: I04-FM22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
650
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT/BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [p]
[ x ] ,
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA CONSIDERED
THE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE PLSS AND SOP AND THAT EACH MUST
ALSO FAIL FOR LOSS OF LIFE TO OCCUR. BECAUSE A SINGLE CAUSAL
EVENT CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF THESE REDUNDANCIES, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS
FAILURE OF SCREEN C AND A 2/IR CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-828X
NASA FMEA #: I04-FM23
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
828
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT/BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B.
THE IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B TO REFLECT THE INABILITY
TO DETECT THIS FAILURE FOR AN ITEM WHICH IS NOT STANDBY
REDUNDANT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-651
NASA FMEA #: I04-FM24
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
651
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT/BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR SCREEN
B. THE IOA RECOMMENDS SCREEN B BE FAILED BECAUSE THE ITEM ITSELF
IS NOT STANDBY REDUNDANT AND BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS NOT READILY
DETECTABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-651A
NASA FMEA #: I04-FM25
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
651
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT/BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [F] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR SCREEN
B. THE IOA RECOMMENDS SCREEN B BE FAILED BECAUSE THE ITEM ITSELF
IS NOT STANDBY REDUNDANT AND BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS NOT READILY
DETECTABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-881X
NASA FMEA #: I04-FM26
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
881
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH
THE REMAINDER OF THE ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-882X
NASA FMEA #: I04-FM27
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
882
LOWERTORSORESTRAINT BLADDERASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH
THE REMAINDER OF THE ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-883X
NASA FMEA #: I04-FM28
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
883
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-152
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-652
NASA FMEA #: I04-FM29
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 652
ITEM: BOOT DISCONNECT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE IOA AN THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA CONSIDERS THE
PLSS AND SOP AS REDUNDANT FUNCTIONS FOR PRESSURIZATION AND EACH
MUST BE LOST TO RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE WHEN THIS FAILURE OCCURS.
BECAUSE A SINGLE EVENT CAN OCCUR WHICH CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCIES, THE IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN C AND A
2/IR CRITICALITY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-657
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
657
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (LTA SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST : J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BECAUSE USAGE OF THE "PRYBAR" TO SUPPORT DOFFING A "FAILED MATED"
LTA-TO-HUT WOULD DAMAGE THE MECHANISM, THE SUIT WOULD BE UNUSABLE
FOR NEXT EVA MISSION. THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2
CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-830X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM30
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 830
ITEM: BOOT DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS NOT
READILY DETECTABLE AND THE ITEM FAILING IS NOT STANDBY REDUNDANT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-867X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM31
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 867
ITEM: BOOT DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] IF] [ ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS NOT
READILY DETECTABLE AND THE ITEM FAILING IS NOT STANDBY REDUNDANT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-156
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-654
NASA FMEA #: I04-FM32
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
654
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS NOT
READILY DETECTABLE AND THE ITEM FAILING IS NOT STANDBY REDUNDANT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-654A
I04-FM33
EMU
654
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBLY
J. WHITMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [P] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS NOT
READILY DETECTABLE AND THE ITEM FAILING IS NOT STANDBY REDUNDANT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-653
I04-FM34
EMU
653
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBLY
J. WHITMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA CONSIDERED
THE PLSS AND THE SOP TO BE REDUNDANT FUNCTIONS WHICH MUST ALSO
FAIL FUNCTIONALLY TO CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE. THE IOA RECOGNIZES THAT
THE FAILURE MUST BE EXTREMELY SEVERE TO CAUSE LOSS OF THESE
FUNCTIONS AND TO ADDRESS THE POSSIBILITY THAT A SINGLE EVENT CAN
REUSLT IN FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCIES, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A 2/IRc CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-833X
NASA FMEA #: I04-FM35
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
833
PRESSUREBOOT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-831X
NASA FMEA #: I04-FM36
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
831
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-832X
I04-FM37
EMU
832
PRESSUREBOOT ASSEMBLY
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IN ADDITION TO LOCALIZED HOT/COLD SPOTS, THE IOA CONSIDERED THE
POSSIBILITY THAT AN ABRADED SOLE COULD MAKE USE OF FOOT
RESTRAINTS A DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE TASK. IF UNABLE TO BE USED
OR SEVERE DISCOMFORT RESULTS, THE MISSION MAY HAVE TO BE
TERMINATED.
THE IOA THEREFORE RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION IN
THE CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-162
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-655
NASA FMEA #: I04-FM38
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
655
BOOT SIZING INSERT
LEAD ANALYST : J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-835X
NASA FMEA #: I04-FM39
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
835
BOOT SIZING INSERT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] £ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-656
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
656
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (LTA SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
Cx]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE ]
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-856X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM40
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
856
WAIST/BRIEF/LTA/BOOT TMG
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA CONSIDERED THE POSSIBLITY THAT LOCAL HOT/COLD SPOTS COULD
CAUSE SIGNIFICANT CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT SUCH THAT THE MISSION IS
IMPACTED. THE IOA, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY AND
INCLUSION IN THE CIL FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-884X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM41
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
884
WAIST/BRIEF/LTA/BOOT TMG
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-659
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
659
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (LTA SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA ANALYSIS DID NOT ORIGINALLY CONSIDER THE ROTATIONAL
REQUIREMENT AS REDUNDANT; HOWEVER, UPON FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA
DOES ACCEPT IT AND AGREES WITH THE NASA FINDINGS.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-885X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM :
EMU
885
DONNING AID HANDLES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-854X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
854
DONNING AID HANDLES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-855X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
855
DONNINGAID HANDLES
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-853X
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
853
DOFFING LEVER SUBASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-646
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
646
WAIST RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA CONSIDERS THE
PLSS AND THE SOP AS REDUNDANT FUNCTIONS WHICH MUST BE FAILED TO
CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE. BECAUSE IT IS
POSSIBLE A SINGLE EVENT CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES, THE
IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IRc CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
EMU-622 BASELINE [ ]
105-FMI NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 622
ITEM: HELMET ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
J. WHITMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BECAUSE A SEVERE LEAK IN THE HELMET AREA COULD CAUSE CESSATION OF
ORAL/NASAL VENTILATION IN ADDITION TO LOSS OF PLSS AND SOP, THE
IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-809X
NASA FMEA #: 105-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 809
ITEM: HELMET ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. UPON
FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-807X
NASA FMEA #: 105-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 807
ITEM: HELMET ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-886X
NASA FMEA #: 105-FM4
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 886
ITEM: HELMET ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-177
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
EMU-808X
105-FM5
EMU
808
HELMET ASSEMBLY
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-178
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-620
NASA FMEA #: 105-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
620
COMBINATION PURGE VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-179
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-621
NASA FMEA #: 105-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
621
COMBINATION PURGE VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY TO REFLECT FAILURE OF
REDUNDANT PRESSURE CONTROL ELEMENTS IN THIS SCENARIO.
ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA ANALYSIS INCORPORATED INTERNAL LEAKAGE INTO
THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-180
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-637
106-FMI
EMU
637
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
J. WHITMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-181
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-642
NASA FMEA #: 106-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
642
WRIST DISCONNECT (GLOVE SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [p]
[ x ] ,
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA CONSIDERED
THE FACT THAT LOSS OF LIFE REQUIRES A COMBINATION OF FAILURES OF
HARDWARE AND SOP/PLSS FUNCTIONS. TO IDENTIFY LOSS OF ALL
FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCIES FROM A COMMON CAUSE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A
2/iRc ASSIGNMENT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-182
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-822X
NASA FMEA #: 106-FMII
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
822
WRIST DISCONNECT (GLOVE SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-183
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-823X
NASA FMEA #: 106-FMI2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
823
WRIST DISCONNECT (GLOVE SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] [P] [P] [ ]*
[P] [F] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FOR THE WORST CASE, LOSS OF TETHERED OBJECTS CAN RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT AND, THEREFORE, MISSION
TERMINATION.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-184
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-643
NASA FMEA #: 106-FMI3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
643
WRIST DISCONNECT (GLOVE SIDE)
J. WHITMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-185
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-645
NASA FMEA #: 106-FMI4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 645
ITEM: PALM RESTRAINT
LEAD ANALYST : J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-186
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-644
NASA FMEA #: 106-FMI5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 644
ITEM: PALM RESTRAINT
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-187
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
EMU-859X
106-FMI6
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 859
ITEM: GLOVE TMG
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-188
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-858X
NASA FMEA #: 106-FMI7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 858
ITEM: GLOVE TMG
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLI GHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-189
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-860X
NASA FMEA #: 106-FMI8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 860
ITEM: GLOVE TMG
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-190
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-864X
NASA FMEA #: 106-FMI9
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 864
ITEM: MITTEN ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-191
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-640A
106-FM2
EMU
640
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
J. WHITMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-192
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU-857X
106-FM20
EMU
857
COMFORT GLOVE
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C ]
C ]
[ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-193
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
EMU-640 BASELINE [ ]
106-FM3 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 640
ITEM: RESTRAINT MODIFIED
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
J. WHITMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA AGREE EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. THE IOA
RECOMMENDS SCREEN B BE FAILED BECAUSE THIS FAILURE MODE IS NOT
SURE TO BE DETECTED AND BECAUSE THE ITEM FAILING IS NOT STANDBY
REDUNDANT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-194
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-887X
NASA FMEA #: 106-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
887
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-195
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-639
NASA FMEA #: 106-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
639
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_L_/_KS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY TO REFLECT POSSIBLE LOSS OF
GLOVE DEXTERITY AND CREWMEMBER DISCOMFORT WHICH CAN RESULT IN
MISSION TERMINATION. THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD ALSO THEN BE
INCLUDED IN THE CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-196
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-819X
NASA FMEA #: 106-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 819
ITEM: RESTRAINT MODIFIED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA DOES NOT CONSIDER NERVE COMPRESSION A FAILURE MODE AND
THEREFORE RECOMMENDS ITS DELETION FROM THE FMEA AND CIL. THIS
FAILURE AND ITS EFFECTS ARE APPLICABLE TO OPERATIONS PERTAINING
TO FIT WHICH ARE TYPICALLY PERFORMED PRE-FLIGHT AND THEREFORE
NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-197
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-638
NASA FMEA #: 106-FM7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
638
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LOSS OF GLOVE FUNCTION WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED FOR MISSION
SUCCESS, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE MODE CRITICLAITY TO BE A
2/2 AND THAT THE FAILURE MODE BE INCLUDED IN THE CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-198
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-641
NASA FMEA #: 106-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 641
ITEM: BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [p] IF]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA CONSIDERS THE
PLSS AND SOP AS REDUNDANCIES WHICH MUST ALSO BE FAILED TO RESULT
IN LOSS OF LIFE. TO REFLECT A CAUSAL EVENT WHICH MAY ALSO RESULT
IN LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES AND THEREBY LOSS OF LIFE, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A 2/IRc CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-199
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-821X
NASA FMEA #: 106-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 821
ITEM: BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-200
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-888X
NASA FMEA #: 107-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
888
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 j [ j [ j [ j [ A J
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 BECAUSE OF RESULTANT POOR LCVG FIT AND
DEGRADED COOLING. CONSISTENCY WITH NASA FMEAs 107-FM2 AND FM3
ALSO RESULTS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-201
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-664
NASA FMEA #: 107-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
664
VENT MANIFOLD AND DUCTS
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-202
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-837X
NASA FMEA #: 107-FMII
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
837
VENT MANIFOLD AND DUCTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCYSCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-203
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-838X
107-FMI2
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
EMU
838
VENT MANIFOLD AND DUCTS
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-204
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-665
NASA FMEA #: 107-FMI3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
665
VENT MANIFOLD AND DUCTS
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-205
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-839X
NASA FMEA #: 107-FMI4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
839
MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (LCVG HALF)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-206
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-667
NASA FMEA #: 107-FMI5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
667
MULTIUPLE CONNECTOR (LCVG HALF)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-207
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-668
NASA FMEA #: 107-FMI6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
668
MULTIUPLE CONNECTOR (LCVG HALF)
LEAD ANALYST : J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN C. THE IOA AND NASA ARE IN
AGREEMENT FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-208
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-666
NASA FMEA #: 107-FMI7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
666
MULTIUPLE CONNECTOR (LCVG HALF)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-209
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-660A
NASA FMEA #: 107-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
660
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] C ] [ ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-210
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-660
NASA FMEA #: 107-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
66O
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[' N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-211
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-661
NASA FMEA #: I07-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
661
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-212
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-836X
NASA FMEA #: 107-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
836
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-213
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-662
NASA FMEA #: 107-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
662
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-214
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-861X
NASA FMEA #: 107-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
861
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-215
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-862X
NASA FMEA #: 107-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
862
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-216
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-663
NASA FMEA #: 107-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 663
ITEM: LINER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-217
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-810X
NASA FMEA #: 108-FMI
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 810
ITEM: EVVA
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-218
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-863X
NASA FMEA #: 108-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 863
ITEM: EVVA TMG
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-219
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-889X
NASA FMEA #: I08-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
889
EXTRAVEHICULARVISOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-220
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-625
NASA FMEA #: 108-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
625
EXTRAVEHICULARVISOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
[ x] *
[X]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-221
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-890X
NASA FMEA #: 108-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
890
EXTRAVEHICULARVISOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-222
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EMU-811X
108-FM5
EMU
811
EVVA
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
TO REFLECT MISSION IMPACT OF VISOR FAILURE IN CONCERT WITH THIS
FAILURE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/2R CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-223
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-812X
NASA FMEA #: 108-FM6
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 812
ITEM: EVVA
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] C N ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [P] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B
REGARDING WHICH THE NASA ANALYSIS IS CONTRADICTORY IN THAT IT
AFFIRMS DETECTABILITY IN FLIGHT BUT FAILS SCREEN B. THE IOA
RECOMMENDS PASSAGE OF SCREEN B DUE TO SENSORY CAPABILITY TO
OBSERVE LOOSE
LIGHTS OR "LOOSE" MOVEMENT ON THE HELMET. (NOTE: THIS CHANGE WAS
AGREED TO BE THE NASA SSM).
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-224
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-626
NASA FMEA #: 108-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
626
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA BELIEVES THE ASSIGNED NASA CRITICALITY IS A TYPOGRAPHICAL
ERROR DUE TO THE EFFECTS COLUMN INDICATING MISSION TERMINATION
MAY RESULT FROM THIS FAILURE MODE. THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2
CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION IN THE CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-225
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-623
NASA FMEA #: 108-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
623
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT; HOWEVER, THE NASA FMEA
SHOULD ADDRESS FAILED OPEN SEPARATELY FROM FAILED CLOSED.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-226
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-624
NASA FMEA #: 108-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
624
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT BECAUSE THE NASA
INCLUDED BOTH FAILED OPEN AND FAILED CLOSED IN A SINGLE FMEA.
THE IOA BELIEVES A FAILED CLOSED SUN VISOR WILL NOT IMPACT A
MISSION AND THEREFORE RECOMMENDS A 3/3 CRITICAILTY FOR THIS
SPECIFIC
FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-227
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-891X
NASA FMEA #: 108-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
891
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-228
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-669
NASA FMEA #: II0-FMI
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
669
BITE VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-229
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-670
NASA FMEA #: II0-FM2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
670
BITE VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-230
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-670A
NASA FMEA #: II0-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
670
BITE VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-231
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-671
NASA FMEA #: II0-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 671
ITEM: BLADDERASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-232
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-672
NASA FMEA #: II0-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 672
ITEM: BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY TO REFLECT WORST CASE
SCENARIO WHERE IDB COULD POSITION ITSELF WHERE DISCOMFORT IS
EXCESSIVE (MOBILITY OF CREWPERSON'S HEAD OR VISION CAN BE
IMPAIRED) AND MISSION TERMINATION RESULTS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-233
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-674
NASA FMEA #: II0-FM6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
674
INLET VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-234
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-673
NASA FMEA #: II0-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
673
INLET VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[p]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-235
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-247
NASA FMEA #: III-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
247
PRIMARY OXYGENBOTTLES (ITEM III)-QTY-2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] C ] C ]
C P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-236
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
EMU-246 BASELINE [ ]
III-FM2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
246
PRIMARY OXYGEN BOTTLES (ITEM III)-QTY-2
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-237
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-249
NASA FMEA #: II2-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
249
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 112)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-238
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-252
NASA FMEA #: II2-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
252
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 112)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA DISAGREES WITH THE NASA FINDINGS BECAUSE THE FAILED FULL
HIGH FAILURE MODE, WHEN DETECTED DURING THE EVA, WILL RESULT IN
IMMEDIATE MISSION TERMINATION. ALTHOUGH THE DETECTION TECHNIQUE
IS VIA A STATUS CHECK THE IOA CANNOT CONSIDER THAT CHECK
A REDUNDANT FUNCTION TO THIS SENSOR. THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
CAUSES IDENTIFIED BY THE NASA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-239
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-250
NASA FMEA #: II2-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
250
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 112)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-240
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-251
NASA FMEA #: II2-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
251
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 112)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREENS; HOWEVER, THE IOA RECOMMENDS
A 2/IR CRITICALITY DUE TO A WORST CASE SCENARIO WHERE THE PRIMARY
OXYGEN IS PREMATURELY DEPLETED AND THE SOP IS FAILED. THIS ALSO
CONSIDERS THAT ALTHOUGH THE FAILURE IS READILY
DETECTABLE IN THE AIRLOCK, IT IS NOT DETECTABLE DURING EVA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-241
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-253
NASA FMEA #: II2-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
253
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURESENSOR (ITEM 112)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS •
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-242
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-254 BASELINE [ ]
II2-FM6 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
254
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 112)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-243
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-248
NASA FMEA #: II2-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
248
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 112)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-244
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-227
NASA FMEA #: II3A-FMI
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
227
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM II3A)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-245
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-228
NASA FMEA #: II3A-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
228
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM II3A)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-246
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-222
NASA FMEA #: II3A-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
222
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM II3A)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA DISAGREES WITH THE NASA FINDINGS. THE IOA RECOMMENDS A
2/IR CRITICALITY TO REFLECT SCENARIO OF LEAK WITH CONCURRENT
CHECK VALVE AND SOP FAILURES. SCREENS SHOULD ALL BE PASSED.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-247
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-223
NASA FMEA #: II3A-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
223
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM II3A)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-248
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-230
NASA FMEA #: II3B-FMI
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
230
ADJUSTABLE ORIFICE (ITEM II3B)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
F L/
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-249
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-231
NASA FMEA #: II3B-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
231
ADJUSTABLE ORIFICE (ITEM II3B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-250
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-229
NASA FMEA #: II3B-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
229
ADJUSTABLE ORIFICE (ITEM II3B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-251
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-234
NASA FMEA #: II3C-FMI
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
234
ON/OFF VALVE (ITEM I13C)
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-252
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-233
NASA FMEA #: II3C-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
233
ON/OFF VALVE (ITEM I13C)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT ON SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS AND
HARDWARE CRITICALITY; HOWEVER, THE FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY IS
RECOMMENDED TO BE A "2". THE IOA MAKES THIS SUGGESTION DUE TO
THE VALVE BEING MECHANICALLY POSITIONED "OPEN" PRE-EVA AND
THEREFORE NOT CAPABLE OF THIS FAILURE WITHOUT OPERATOR ERROR
(WHICH IS ADVERSE TO GROUNDRULES) DURING THE EVA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-253
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/i0/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-232
NASA FMEA #: II3C-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
232
ON/OFF VALVE (ITEM I13C)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-254
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
EMU-236
II3D-FMI
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
236
PRIMARY REGULATOR (ITEM 113 D)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-237
NASA FMEA #: II3D-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
237
PRIMARY REGULATOR (ITEM II3D)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-238
II3D-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
238
PRIMARY REGULATOR (ITEM II3D)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] [N] [N]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN DISAGREEMENT IN THAT NASA HAS BOUNDED
THIS FAILURE MODE SUCH THAT IT DOES NOT REPRESENT THE WORST CASE
SCENARIO. ADDITIONALLY, BY SUCH BOUNDS THIS FAILURE MODE IS VERY
SIMILAR TO II3D-FM7 REGARDING OSCILLATING OUTPUT.
THE IOA, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY, PASSAGE OF ALL
SCREENS, AND INCLUSION IN THE CIL FOR THIS FAILURE MODE WHICH
SHOULD ALSO NOT BE BOUNDED. THE FAILURE MODE SHOULD ALSO BE
BROKEN INTO TWO-DRIFT HIGH AND DRIFT LOW.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-239
NASA FMEA #: II3D-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
239
PRIMARY REGULATOR (ITEM II3D)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN DISAGREEMENT IN THAT NASA HAS BOUNDED
THIS FAILURE MODE SUCH THAT IT DOES NOT REPRESENT THE WORST CASE
SCENARIO. ADDITIONALLY, BY SUCH BOUNDS THIS FAILURE MODE IS VERY
SIMILAR TO II3D-FM7 REGARDING OSCILLATING OUTPUT.
THE IOA, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY, PASSAGE OF ALL
SCREENS, AND INCLUSION IN THE CIL FOR THIS FAILURE MODE WHICH
SHOULD ALSO NOT BE BOUNDED. THE FAILURE MODE SHOULD ALSO BE
BROKEN INTO TWO-DRIFT HIGH AND DRIFT LOW.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-240
NASA FMEA #: II3D-FM5, FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
240
PRIMARY REGULATOR (ITEM II3D)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA _ND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
PRECEIDI/_IG PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-712X
NASA FMEA #: II3D-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
712
PRIMARY REGULATOR(ITEM II3D)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A S C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-242
NASA FMEA #: II3E-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
242
H20 REGULATOR (ITEM II3E)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-243
NASA FMEA #: II3E-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
243
H20 REGULATOR (ITEM II3E)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN DISAGREEMENT. THE IOA BELIEVES THE
PRESSURE LIMITATIONS WITHIN THE NASA FAILURE MODE DO NOT
REPRESENT THE WORST CASE SCENARIO. ADDITIONALLY, THE NASA
FAILURE MODE IS VERY SIMILAR TO II3E-FM6 FOR OSCILLATING OUTPUT.
AS SUCH THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY FOR A "REGULATES
HIGH" FAILURE MODE, PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS, AND INCLUSION IN THE
CIL.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-245
NASA FMEA #: II3E-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
245
H20 REGULATOR (ITEM II3E)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-244
NASA FMEA #: II3E-FM4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
244
H20 REGULATOR (ITEM II3E)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT ON HARDWARE CRITICALITY.
HOWEVER, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A "IR" FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY DUE TO
POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS DURING AN EFFORT TO
PROVIDE COOLING AND DEFOG CAPABILITY. ALL SCREENS SHOULD BE
PASSED. ADDITIONALLY, THE NASA FAILURE MODE BOUNDS THE FAILURE
BY PRESSURE RANGE SUCH THAT THE WORST CASE SCENARIO IS NOT FULLY
PRESENTED.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
EMU-241
II3E-FM5
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
241
H20 REGULATOR (ITEM II3E)
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-713X
NASA FMEA #: II3E-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
713
H20 REGULATOR (ITEM II3E)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-209
NASA FMEA #: II4-FMI, FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
209
PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR (ITEM 114)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT ON HARDWARE CRITICALITY AND
SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS. HOWEVER, THE IOARECOMMENDS A "2R"
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY BECAUSE THE SOP IS NOT SEEN AS REDUNDANT
TO THIS SENSOR.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-210
NASA FMEA #: II4-FM3, FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
210
PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR (ITEM 114)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FINDING OF A 2/2 CRITICALITY.
HOWEVER, THE NASA ALSO PLACED A 3/IR CRITICALITY ON EVA
OPERATIONS REGARDING WHICH THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/2R CRITICALITY
DUE TO THE SOP NOT BEING CONSIDERED REDUNDANT TO THIS SENSOR.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-212
NASA FMEA #: II4-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
212
PRESSURESUIT SENSOR (ITEM 114)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
EMU-211
II4-FM6
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
211
PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR (ITEM 114)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-752X
NASA FMEA #: I14-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
752
PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF PRESSURE READ OUT REDUNDANCY SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF
LIFT. IF DETECTED DUE TO A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE, MISSION
TERMINATION WOULD RESULT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-272
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-259
NASA FMEA #: II5-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
259
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-268
NASA FMEA #: II5-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
268
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
EMU-270
II5-FMII
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
270
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ NA]
[ P ]
[N]
C
[P]
[ F ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA FINDINGS AND ASSIGNMENTS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-269
NASA FMEA #: II5-FM12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
269
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FINDINGS.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-257
NASA FMEA #: II5-FMI3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
257
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA DISAGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT. THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A 3/IR TO REFLECT POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS FOR
CONCURRENT FAILURES OF II3A AND OXYGEN SYSTEM COMPONENTS. THIS
ALSO ENSURES CONSISTENCY WITH NASA FAILURE MODE II3A-FM2.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-258
NASA FMEA #: II5-FMI4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
258
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-258A
NASA FMEA #: II5-FMI5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
258
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-255
NASA FMEA #: II5-FMI6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
255
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-714X
NASA FMEA #: II5-FMI7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
714
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-281
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-256
NASA FMEA #: II5-FMI8
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
256
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY&a3528HASSIGRM_NTS IN
FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-282
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-715X
NASA FMEA #: II5-FMI9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
715
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY AND IS IN FULL AGREEMENT
ON SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-283
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-260
NASA FMEA #: II5-FM2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
260
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-284
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
NASASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-753X
NASA FMEA #: II5-FM20
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
753
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ .] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-285
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-754X
NASA FMEA #: II5-FM21
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
754
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/IR] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE ARE TEN (I0) MOUNTING SCREWS. SEVEN ARE REQUIRED TO
MAINTAIN INTEGRITY. THEREFORE, 4 SCREWS MUST BE LOST TO LOSE
INTEGRITY. SINCE NO ONCE SECOND FAILURE CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF
LIFE THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A "3". ALSO, BECAUSE ALL
THE
SCREWS ARE LIKE HARDWARE THEY ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO COMMON CAUSE
FAILURES AND SCREEN C SHOULD BE FAILED.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-286
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-261
NASA FMEA #: II5-FM3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
261
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] [N]
C
[ ]
[ F ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-287
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
EMU-262
II5-FM4
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
262
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ F ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT'
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-288
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-265
NASA FMEA #: II5-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
265
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-289
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-266
NASA FMEA #: II5-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
266
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-290
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-263
NASA FMEA #: II5-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
263
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ NA]
C x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-291
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
EMU-264
II5-FM8
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
264
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-292
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-267
NASA FMEA #: II5-FM9
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
267
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FINDINGS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-293
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-271
NASA FMEA #: II6-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
271
EVA POSITION SWITCH (ITEM 116)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA ALSO NOW
CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE MODE READILY DETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-294
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-272
NASA FMEA #: II6-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
272
EVA POSITION SWITCH (ITEM 116)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. ADDITIONALLY THE IOA NOW
CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE MODE READILY DETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-295
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-275
NASA FMEA #: 120A-FMI
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
275
BLEED ORIFICE (ITEM 120A)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT AND IS IN
AGREEMENT WITH THE SCREEN A AND C ASSIGNMENTS. THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/2R" TO ACCOUNT FOR FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT 120B
RELIEF VALVES SUCH THAT THE WATER TANKS CANNOT BE SERVICED. THE
IOA
DOES NOT CONSIDER THE SOP AS REDUNDANT TO THIS ITEM.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-296
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-274
NASA FMEA #: 120A-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
274
BLEED ORIFICE (ITEM 120A)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B,
REGARDING WHICH THE IOA NOW CONCURS WITH THE NASA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-297
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-273
NASA FMEA #: 120A-FM3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /1R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
273
BLEED ORIFICE (ITEM 120A)
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-298
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-276
NASA FMEA #: 120B-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
276
DUAL MODERELIEF VALVE (ITEM 120B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT AND IS IN FULL
AGREEMENT WITH THE REMAINING ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-299
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/i0/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-277
NASA FMEA #: 120B-FM2, FM3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
277
DUAL MODE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 120B)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-300
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-279
NASA FMEA #: 120B-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
279
DUAL MODE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 120B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [P] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT DUE TO STANDBY
REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES AND IS IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE NASA
ANALYSIS CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-301
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-278
NASA FMEA #: 120B-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
278
DUAL MODERELIEF VALVE (ITEM 120B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA AGREE ON HARDWARE CRITICALITY; HOWEVER,
REGARDING FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A "2R" TO
REFLECT THE MISSION IMPACT RESULTING FROM REDUNDANT FUNCTION
FAILURE. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA RECOMMENDS SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS
AS SHOWN ABOVE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-302
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-282
NASA FMEA #: 120C-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
282
FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE (ITEM 120C)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-303
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-281
NASA FMEA #: 120C-FM2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
281
FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE (ITEM 120C)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA FINDINGS.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-304
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-280
NASA FMEA #: 120C-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
280
FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE (ITEM 120C)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-305
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-201
NASA FMEA #: 121-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
201
CHECK VALVE AND VENT FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[P] IF] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS ARE IN AGREEMENT.
ADDITIONALYY, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA HARDWARE AND
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-306
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-199
NASA FMEA #: 121-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
199
CHECK VALVE AND VENT FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-307
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-198
NASA FMEA #: 121-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
198
CHECK VALVE AND VENT FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-308
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-200
NASA FMEA #: 121-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
200
CHECK VALVE AND VENT FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-309
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-197
NASA FMEA #: 121-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
197
CHECK VALVE AND VENT FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-310
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-204
NASA FMEA #: 122-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
204
C02 TRANSDUCER (ITEM 122)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-311
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-205
NASA FMEA #: 122-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
205
CO2 TRANSDUCER (ITEM 122)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR HARDWARE
CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT. THE IOA NOW AGREES WITH THE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY DEFINED BY THE NASA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-312
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-716X
NASA FMEA #: 122-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
716
CO2 TRANSDUCER (ITEM 122)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-313
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-206
NASA FMEA #: 122-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
206
CO2 TRANSDUCER (ITEM 122)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA ALSO FULLY AGREES
WITH THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-314
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-203
NASA FMEA #: 122-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
203
CO2 TRANSDUCER (ITEM 122)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-315
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-185
NASA FMEA #: 123-FMI
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 185
ITEM: FAN (ITEM 123A)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCYSCREENS
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-316
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-187
NASA FMEA #: 123-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
187
BRUSHLESS MOTOR (ITEM 123B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALTHOUGH THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT, IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT THE "FAILED OFF" FAILURE MODE BE SEPARATED FROM
THE DROPS IN SPEED FAILURE MODE TO ENSURE CLARITY OF THE
ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-317
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-188
NASA FMEA #: 123-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
188
BRUSHLESSMOTOR (ITEM 123B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT; HOWEVER, THE IOA
WOULD RECOMMEND SEPARATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE (LOW SPEED) FROM
THE MOTOR STOPS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-318
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-190
NASA FMEA #: 123-FMII
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
190
BRUSHLESS MOTOR (ITEM 123B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_3672HADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-319
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-751X
NASA FMEA #: 123-FM12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
751
FAN/SEPARATOR/PUMP/MOTORASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-320
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-717X
NASA FMEA #: 123-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 717
ITEM: FAN (ITEM 123A)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IF] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-321
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-184
NASA FMEA #: 123-FM3
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 184
ITEM: FAN (ITEM 123A)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-322
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-178
NASA FMEA #: 123-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
178
ROTARY H20 SEPARATOR (ITEM 123 B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F,] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA CRITICALITY ANALYSIS AND SCREEN A ASSIGNMENT
ARE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE IOA BELIEVES WATER CARRYOVER INTO
THE HELMET AND SSA IS AN UNDESIRED EFFECT AND SHOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED A DETECTION TECHNIQUE. AS SUCH THE IOA
RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B. ADDITIONALLY, BECAUSE WATER MAY
FREEZE IN EITHER OR BOTH PURGE VALVES AND CAUSE LOSS OF
REDUNDANCY THE IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN C.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-323
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-182
NASA FMEA #: 123-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
182
WATERPUMP (ITEM 123C)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY, THE IOA AND THE
NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. BECAUSE THE IOA CONSIDERS VENT FLOW AND
SOP OPERATION AS REDUNDANT FUNCITONS, A FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY OF
"IR" IS RECOMMENDED WITH PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-324
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-179
NASA FMEA #: 123-FM6
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
179
ROTARY H20 SEPARATOR (ITEM 123 B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. (ALSO REFERENCE MDAC ID-
181)
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-325
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-181
NASA FMEA #: 123-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
181
WATER PUMP (ITEM 123C)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT (REF. MDAC ID-179).
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-326
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-183
NASA FMEA #: 123-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC I D:
ITEM :
EMU
183
WATERPUMP (ITEM 123C)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT; HOWEVER, THE IOA
SUGGESTS THE EFFECTS BE MODIFIED TO REFLECT POSSIBLE MOTOR
FAILURE DUE TO INTERNAL H20 LEAKAGE. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS SCREEN B BE FAILED BECAUSE WATER CARRYOVER IS AN
UNDESIRABLE EFFECT WHICH SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A DETECTION
TECHNIQUE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-327
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-189
NASA FMEA #: 123-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
189
BRUSHLESSMOTOR (ITEM 123B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA SCENARIO DID NOT ADDRESS THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCESSIVE
POWER CONSUMPTION NEAR MISSION END. THIS CAN RESULT IN POWER
LOSS AND REQUIRED SOP USAGE. IF THE SOP FAILS, THE CREWPERSON
CAN BE LOST. THE IOA THEREFORE RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY
AND PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-328
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-180
NASA FMEA #: 123-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
180
ROTARY H20 SEPARATOR (ITEM 123 B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ F ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY. TO REFLECT THE WORST CASE SCENARIO AND LOSS OF
REDUNDANT FUNCTIONS (e.g. SOP), THE IOA RECOMMENDS A "IR"
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY AND FAILURE OF SCREEN C (REFLECTS POSSIBLE
ICING
PURGE VALVES). (ALSO REFERENCE MDAC ASSESSMENT ID EMU-186).
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-329
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-186
NASA FMEA #: 123-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
186
BRUSHLESSMOTOR (ITEM 123B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY. TO REFLECT THE WORST CASE SCENARIO (WHICH CAN
INCLUDE H20 CARRYOVER FROM THE FAN SEPARATOR) THE IOA RECOMMENDS
A "IR" CRITICALITY. (ALSO REFERENCE MDAC ID EMU-180).
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-330
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-147
NASA FMEA #: 125-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
147
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE (ITEM 125)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] [NA] [P] [ ]*
[P] [F] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [F] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT ON THE SCREEN A AND C
ASSIGNMENTS; HOWEVER, THE INITIAL IOA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT DID
NOT AGREE WITH THAT OF NASA. AFTER FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA NEW
AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY BUT WOULD MODIFY THE NASA
SCENARIO TO INCLUDE POSSIBLE BLOCKAGE OF THE SEPARATOR PITOT OR
THE 134 VALVE FAILING CLOSED. ADDITIONALLY, BECAUSE THE ITEM IS
AN ACTIVE COMPONENT DURING THE MISSION, THE IOA RECOMMENDS
FAILURE OF SCREEN B AND INCLUSION IN THE CIL.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-148
NASA FMEA #: 125-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
148
PITOT ACTUATEDVALVE (ITEM 125)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
EXCEPT FOR SCREEN B, THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT ON
CRITICALITY AND SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS. THE IOA ALSO DOES NOT FIND
THE FAILURE READILY DETECTABLE SINCE WATER CARRYOVER IS AN
UNDESIRABLE EFFECT WHICH SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A DETECTION
TECHNIQUE. THE IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS REVIEW OF THE EFFECTS FOR THE
POSSIBLE ADDITION OF EFFECTS RESULTANT FROM LOSS OF FAN SEPARATOR
FUNCTION.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-149
NASA FMEA #: 125-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
149
PITOT ACTUATEDVALVE (ITEM 125)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-150
NASA FMEA #: 125-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
150
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE (ITEM 125)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-151
NASA FMEA #: 125-FM4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
151
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE (ITEM 125)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-208
NASA FMEA #: 126-FMI
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
208
FILTER AND ORIFICE (ITEM 126)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR HARDWARE
CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT. THE IOA NOW CONCURS WITH THE NASA
HARDWARE CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
EMU-207
126-FM2
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
207
FILTER AND ORIFICE (ITEM 126)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-157
NASA FMEA #: 127-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
157
PUMP INLET FILTER (ITEM 127)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FOR THE WORST CASE EFFECT, PUMP FAILURE, THE IOA BELIEVES THE
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY SHOULD BE A "IR" WHEN COMBINED WITH LOSS
OF REDUNDANT COOLING FUNCTIONS. THE IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS FAILURE
OF SCREEN B DUE TO THE FAILURE NOT BEING READILY DETECTABLE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-156
NASA FMEA #: 127-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
156
PUMP INLET FILTER (ITEM 127)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A CRITICALITY OF 2/IR WHEN LOSS OF REDUNDANT
FUNCTIONS (SOP AND VENT LOOP COOLING) ARE ALSO CONSIDERED IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THIS FAILURE MODE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-155
NASA FMEA #: 127-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
155
PUMP INLET FILTER (ITEM 127)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-153
NASA FMEA #: 128-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
153
CHECK VALVE AND HOUSING (ITEM 128)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ NA]
[ X] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ J [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-154
NASA FMEA #: 128-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
154
CHECK VALVE AND HOUSING (ITEM 128)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY, THE IOA AND THE
NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA RECOMMENDS A FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY OF "IR" DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE RESULTING WHEN
THE REDUNDANT FUNCTIONS (SOP AND PLSS VENT COOLING) ARE ALSO
FAILED.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-152
NASA FMEA #: 128-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
152
CHECK VALVE AND HOUSING (ITEM 128)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-100
NASA FMEA #: 131/162-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
I00
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1 (ITEM 131)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA FMEA DID NOT FULLY EXTRAPOLATE THE EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE - LOSS OF COOLING AND WATER IN THE VENT LOOP. ALSO, NASA
DID NOT CONSIDER THE SOP AS PROVIDING A REDUNDANT FUNCTION AND,
THEREFORE, DID NOT FAIL IT IN ARRIVING AT THE FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY. THE IOA BELIEVES THE SOP DOES PROVIDE UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY AND THAT THE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE 2/IR.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-103
NASA FMEA #: 131/162-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
103
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1 (ITEM 162)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE NASA FMEA DID NOT FULLY EXTRAPOLATE THE EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE - LOSS OF COOLING AND WATER IN THE VENT LOOP. ALSO, NASA
DID NOT CONSIDER THE SOP AS PROVIDING A REDUNDANT FUNCTION AND,
THEREFORE, DID NOT FAIL IT IN ARRIVING AT THE FUNCTIONAL
ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN "B".
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-102
NASA FMEA #: 131/162-FM2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
102
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1 (ITEM 131)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-105
NASA FMEA #: 131/162-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
105
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1 (ITEM 162)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-101
NASA FMEA #: 131/162-FM3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
i01
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1 (ITEM 131)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-104
NASA FMEA #: 131/162-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
104
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1 (ITEM 162)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-719X
NASA FMEA #: 131/162-FM4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
EMU
719
PRIMARY WATER TANK ASSEMBLY (ITEM 131/162)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-718X
NASA FMEA #: 131/162-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
718
PRIMARY H20 TANK ASSEMBLY (ITEM 131/162)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/IR] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE NASA EXCEPT FOR HARDWARE
CRITICALITY. THE IOA RECOMMENDS A "3/IR" BECAUSE A MINIMUM OF 3
REDUNDANT ITEM FAILURES MUST OCCUR TO RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-720X
NASA FMEA #: 131/162-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
720
PRIMARY WATERTANK ASSEMBLY (ITEM 131/162)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT. THE IOA, UPON
FURTHER REVIEW, AGREES WITH PASSAGE OF SCREEN C.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-284 BASELINE [ ]
132A-FMI NEW [ X ]
EMU
284
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR-O2 SIDE (ITEM 132A)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA DOES NOT CONSIDER THE SINGLE FAILURE A MISSION IMPACT
UNLESS REDUNDANCY IS ALSO LOST. THE IOA THEREFORE RECOMMENDS A
3/2R CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-285
NASA FMEA #: 132A-FM2, FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
285
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURESENSOR-O2 SIDE (ITEM 132A)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FINDINGS.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-286
NASA FMEA #: 132A-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
286
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURESENSOR-O2 SIDE (ITEM 132A)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NAA SCREEN B AND DEFINED EFFECTS.
IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT ON THE REMAINDER OF THE
ANALYSIS.
THE
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-283
NASA FMEA #: 132A-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
283
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURESENSOR-O2 SIDE (ITEM 132A)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
EXCEPT FOR SCREEN B, THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
IOA NOW AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B.
THE
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-109
NASA FMEA #: 132B-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
109
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 132B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE SENSOR FAILURE (BIASED OR FAILED HIGH) WILL HAVE NO IMMEDIATE
IMPACT TO THE CREWMEMBER, EMU, OR MISSION. THE IOA RECOGNIZES
THAT THE LOSS OF THIS SENSOR WILL NOT PERMIT THE CREWPERSON TO
DETECT RESERVE WATER SUPPLY USEAGE, HOWEVER THE EMU IS
NOMINALLY SUPPLIED SUFFICIENT WATER FOR A STANDARD DURATION EVA
AND THE ELAPSED LINE DURATION IS AVAILABLE TO THE CREWPERSON.
DOWNSTREAM PRESSURE TO THE SUBLIMATOR IS ALSO MONITORED TO ENSURE
ACCEPTABLE SUPPLY PRESSURE. THE ADDITIONAL FAILURES OF TIME
AND DOWNSTREAM PRESSURES WILL RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION. THE
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS SCREEN B BE FAILED DUE TO A POSSIBLE FAILURE
OF THE SENSOR AT ITS NOMINAL VALUE JUST PRIOR TO RESERVE TANK
USEGE. (NOTE: NASA HAS AN ADDITIONAL CRITIALITY OF 3/iRb
ASSIGNED THIS FAILURE).
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-II0
NASA FMEA #: 132B-FM2, FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: ii0
ITEM: FDW SUPPLY PRESSUR SENSOR (ITEM 132B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A BIASED LOW OR FAILED LOW SENSOR CAN RESULT IN A NUISANCE ALARM
AND PREVENT TO CREWMEMBER FROM DETECTING ACTUAL RESERVE TO TANK
USEAGE. THE CREWPERSON WOULD ALSO BE REQUIRED TO JUDGE WHETHER
THIS VALUE IS INDICATIVE OF ANOTHER FAILURE. THE IOA
THEREFORE AGREES WITH THE NASA.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-II2
NASA FMEA #: 132B-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
112
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURESENSOR (ITEM 132B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY AND SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-III
NASA FMEA #: 132B-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
ill
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 132B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-360
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
VA_M:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
EMU-163 BASELINE [ ]
134-FMI NEW [ X ]
EMU
163
CONDENSATEH20 RELIEF
G. RAFFAELLI
(ITEM 134)
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA HARDWARE CRITICALITIES AND SCREEN A/B
ASSIGNMENTS ARE IN AGREEMENT. UPON FURTHER REVIEW OF THE
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY, THE IOA HAS FOUND THE NASA SCRENARIO
CRIDIBLE AND THEREFORE AGREES WITH THE NASA FINDING. HOWEVER,
BECAUSE THE
ITEM NORMALLY FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE MISSION, THE IOA RECOMMENDS
FAILURE OF SCREEN B.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-164
NASA FMEA #: 134-FM2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
164
CONDENSATE H20 RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 134)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [F] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B WHICH
THE IOA RECOMMENDS FAILED. THE IOA DOES NOT CONSIDER THE FAILURE
READILY DETECTABLE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
EMU-165 BASELINE [ ]
134-FM2 NEW [ X ]
EMU
165
CONDENSATEH20 RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 134)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT REGARDING CRITICALITY AND
SCREEN A. THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN C ASSIGNMENT;
HOWEVER, THE IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE WATER
CARRYOVER IS AN UNDESIRABLE EFFECT AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A
DETECTION METHOD.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-162
NASA FMEA #: 134-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
162
CONDENSATEH20 RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 134)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-123
NASA FMEA #: 135-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
123
FEEDWATER RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 135)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-365
APPENDIX
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-125
NASA FMEA #: 135-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
125
FEEDWATER RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 135)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FINDINGS. ALSO THE IOA WOULD
RECOMMEND MODIFICATION OF EFFECTS TO INDICATE SCU PRESSURE
REGULATION AS A REDUNDANT FUNCTION.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-366
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-124
NASA FMEA #: 135-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
124
FEEDWATER RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 135)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOAAND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR HARDWARE
CRITICALITY AND SCREEN B. DUE TO THE DUAL O-RINGS THE IOA AGREES
WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY BUT RECOMMENDS PASSAGE OF SCREEN B BE
"NA". (THIS HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY THE NASA SSM).
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-121
NASA FMEA #: 136-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
121
FEEDWATER PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 136)
LEAD ANALYST: G° RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AN INTERNAL LEAKAGE PATH COULD PROVIDE WATER AT AN UNREGULATED
PRESSURE TO THE SUBLIMATORAND RESULT IN BREAKTHROUGH AND LOSS OF
COOLING, THEREBY CAUSING MISSION TERMINATION. ADDITIONALLY, WITH
AN SOP FAILURE THERE COULD BE LOSS OF LIFE. THE IOA
THEREFORE RECOMMENDS A CRITICALITY OF 2/IR.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-II9
NASA FMEA #: 136-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
119
FEEDWATER PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 136)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-120
NASA FMEA #: 136-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
120
FEEDWATER PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 136)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
Ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-122 BASELINE [ ]
136-FM4 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
122
FEEDWATER PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 136)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[p]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-128 BASELINE [ ]
137-FMI NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
128
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 137)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-372
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-129
NASA FMEA #: 137-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
129
FEEDWATERSHUTOFFVALVE (ITEM 137)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE IOA
DISAGREES WITH THE NASA EVA ASSIGNMENT OF 2/2 IN THAT THE VALVE
IS NOT NOMINALLY CLOSED DURING EVA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-131
NASA FMEA # : 137-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
131
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 137)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-126
NASA FMEA #: 137-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
126
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 137)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-127
NASA FMEA #: 137-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
127
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 137)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR SCREEN B
REGARDING WHICH THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FINDING.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-130
NASA FMEA #: 137-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
130
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 137)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A FAILURE SUCH AS THIS (AN ELECTRICAL SHORT) CAN RESULT IN THE
VALVE FAILING CLOSED OR USE OF AVAILABLE BATTERY POWER DURING
EVA; EITHER OF WHICH, IF COMBINED WITH AN SOP FAILURE, CAN RESULT
IN LOSS OF LIFE. THEREFORE, A 2/IR CRITICALITY IS RECOMMENDED.
THE IOA ALSO NOW RECOMMENDS PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-132
NASA FMEA #: 138-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
132
FEEDWATER PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 138)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [p]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-378
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-133
NASA FMEA #: 138-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
133
FEEDWATER PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 138)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-379
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-135
NASA FMEA #: 138-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
135
FEEDWATER PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 138)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-380
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-134
NASA FMEA #: 138-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
134
FEEDWATERPRESSURESENSOR (ITEM 138)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / .] [ J [ .] [ .] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ASSIGNMENTS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-381
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-144
NASA FMEA #: 139-FMI, FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
144
TEMPERATURE SENSOR & HARNESS (ITEM 139)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-382
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-146
NASA FMEA #: 139-FM2, FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
146
TEMPERATURE SENSOR & HARNESS (ITEM 139)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-383
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-143
NASA FMEA #: 139-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
143
TEMPERATURE SENSOR & HARNESS (ITEM 139)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(DD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-384
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
EMU-721X
140-FMI
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
721
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-385
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-756X
NASA FMEA #: 140-FMI0
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
756
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /F ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA AGREE EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. THE IOA CONSIDERS
THE FAILURE TO BE NOT DETECTABLE BECAUSE THE UNDESIRABLE EFFECTS
OF HELMET FOGGING, WOULD BE THE FIRST INDICATION AND WOULD THEN
REQUIRE EMERGENCY USE OF THE SOP.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-386
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-137
NASA FMEA #: 140-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
137
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-387
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-755X
NASA FMEA #: 140-FM3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
755
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA CONSIDERS THE FAILURE TO NOT BE DETECTABLE BECAUSE THE
UNDESIREABLE EFFECT OF HELMET FOGGING WOULD BE THE FIRST
INDICATION AND THEN WOULD REQUIRE EMERGENCY USE OF THE SOP.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-388
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-142
NASA FMEA #: 140-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
142
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE NASA ASSIGNMENTS EXCEPT FOR
SCREEN B. BECAUSE WATER CARRYOVER INTO THE HELMET IS AN
UNDESIRED EFFECT, THE IOA DOES NOT CONSIDER IT A DETECTION
TECHNIQUE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-389
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-140
NASA FMEA #: 140-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
140
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA SCREEN C ASSIGNMENT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-390
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/I0/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-139
NASA FMEA #: 140-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
139
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] IN] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ 3 [ ] [ J [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR SCREEN B.
IOA NOW AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
THE
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-391
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-138
NASA FMEA #: 140-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
138
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-392
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-136
NASA FMEA # : 140-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
136
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN A.
FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA NOW AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
UPON
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-393
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-141
NASA FMEA #: 140-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
141
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-394
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-159
NASA FMEA #: 141-FMI, FM3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
159
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA BELIEVES FAILURE OF REDUNDANT COOLING FUNCTIONS WHEN
COMBINED WITH THE WORST CASE EFFECT OF THIS FAILURE (LOSS OF LCG
COOLING) CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AND THEREFORE WARRANTS
A 2/1R CRITICALITY. THE IOA HAS ALSO TAKEN NOTE THAT THE
CREWPERSON COULD SENSE THE TEMPERATURE CHANGE AND, THEREFORE,
RECOMMENDS PASSAGE OF SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-395
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-160
NASA FMEA #: 141-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
160
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA CONSIDERS THE WORST CASE LOSS OF WATER FLOW TO BE A
FUNTIONAL "IR" WHEN REDUNDANT COOLING FUNCTIONS ARE ALSO
CONSIDERED FAILED.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-396
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-158
NASA FMEA #: 141-FM4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
158
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-397
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-161
NASA FMEA #: 141-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
161
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] IF] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN C AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH
THE REMAINING ASSIGNMENTS EXCEPT FOR SCREEN B. THE IOA CONSIDERS
WATER CARRYOVER AN UNDESIRED EFFECT AND NOT A DETECTION
TECHNIQUE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-398
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-II3
NASA FMEA #: 142-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
113
WATER RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 142)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [F] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SCREEN B, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA
ANALYSIS. THE IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE
RELIEF VALVE IS FULLY EXPECTED TO OPERATE DURING A MISSION
(WHETHER TO PERMIT RESERVE TANK USAGE OR DRAINAGE) AND ITS
FAILURE WOULD
NOT BE READILY DETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-399
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-II4
NASA r-qTEA #: 142-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
114
WATER RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 142)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/IR] [ ] [F] [ ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A HARDWARE CRITICALITY OF "2" TO REFLECT WORST
CASE MISSION IMPACT (LOSS OF 30 MINUTES FEEDWATER TIME) AND TO
REFLECT CONCURRENT LOSS OF SOP WHICH RESULTS IN LOSS OF LIFE.
ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B DUE TO
THE ITEM'S OPERATION AS PART OF A NORMAL MISSION WHICH CAN
INCLUDE H20 DRAINAGE. SPRING DAMAGE IS ALSO A VIABLE CAUSE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-400
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-II5
NASA FMEA #: 142-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
115
WATER RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 142)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-401
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-II6
NASA FMEA #: 143-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
116
WATER CHECK VALVE (ITEM 143)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/1R] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-402
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-II7
NASA FMEA #: 143-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
117
WATER CHECK VALVE (ITEM 143)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN LIMITED AGREEMENT. THE IOA
RECOMMENDS ADDITION OF SPRING FRACTURE TO THE CAUSES AND THE
FAILURE OF SCREEN B. THE ITEM'S OPERATION IS REQUIRED TO CHANGE
THE RESERVE TANK AND IS THEREFORE NOT STRICTLY STANDBY REDUNDANT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-403
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-II8
NASA FMEA #: 143-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
118
WATER CHECK VALVE (ITEM 143)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-404
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-213
NASA FMEA #: 145-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
213
RELIEF VALVE AND ORIFICE (ITEM 145)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-405
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-214
NASA FMEA #: 145-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
214
RELIEF VALVE AND ORIFICE (ITEM 145)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-406
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-215
NASA FMEA #: 145-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
215
RELIEF VALVE AND ORIFICE (ITEM 145)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS. HOWEVER,
DISAGREEMENT EXISTS ON THE CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT. IF A SECOND
FAILURE OF THE SOP REGULATOR WERE TO OCCUR THE 02 LINES AND VENT
LOOP COULD BE EXPOSED TO 200PSI OXYGEN WHICH CAN RESULT IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND FIRE (RESULTANT FROM A
"VIOLET" LOSS OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY).
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-407
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-217
NASA FMEA #: 146-FMI
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
217
POSITIVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 146)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-408
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-216
NASA FMEA #: 146-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM :
EMU
216
POSITIVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 146)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-409
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-218
NASA FMEA #: 146-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
218
POSITIVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 146)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT IN THAT THE IOA ALSO NOW
CONCURS WITH THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-410
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-723X
NASA FMEA #: 146-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
723
POSITIVE PRESSURERELIEF VALVE (ITEM 146)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-411
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-219
NASA FMEA #: 147-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
219
NEGATIVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 147)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-412
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-220
NASA FMEA #: 147-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
220
NEGATIVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 147)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA DISAGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS. THE IOA BELIEVES THE
NASA HAS ACTUALLY COMBINED THE EVA PORTION OF THIS FAILURE MODE
INTO NASA FMEA 147FMI - WHICH IS A 2/IR CRITICALITY. THE IOA
THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THE EVA PHASE BENALYZED HEREIN AND THE
2/IR CRITICALITY ASSIGNED.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-413
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-221
NASA FMEA #: 147-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
221
NEGATIVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 147)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS BUT WOULD INCLUDE SPRING
FRACTURE AS A VIABLE CAUSE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-414
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-106
NASA FMEA #: 148-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
106
RESERVE H20 TANK (ITEM 148)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA FMEA DID NOT FULLY EXTRAPOLATE THE EFFECTS OF THE
FAILURE ON EARLY LOSS OF COOLING AND WATER IN THE VENT LOOP.
ALSO, NASA DID NOT CONSIDER THE SOP AS PROVIDING A REDUNDANT
FUNCTION AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT FAIL IT IN ARRIVING AT THE
FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY. THE IOA BELIEVES THE SOP DOES PROVIDE UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY AND THAT THE CRITICALITY SHOULD BE 2/IR.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-415
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-108
NASA FMEA #: 148-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
108
RESERVE H20 TANK (ITEM 148)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ N ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ [ / ] [ ] P] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
EXCEPT FOR SCREEN B, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS
CRITICALITY AND REDUNDANCY SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS; ADDITIONALLY, THE
IOA DISAGREES WITH THE SCOPE OF EFFECTS DEFINED THEREIN.
ASSUMING THE CREWMEMBER IS EVA, A FAILURE SUCH AS THIS WOULD
DRAIN THE
RESERVE TANK. THIS WOULD CAUSE THE 143 CHECK VALVE TO OPEN AND
THEN DRAIN THE PRIMARY TANKS. AS SUCH NOT ONLY THE "LAST 30
MINUTE" WATER SUPPLY BUT THE ENTIRE SUPPLY COULD BE LOST. THIS
WOULD BE READILY DETECTABLE BY THE CREWMEMBER. REGARDING
FAILURE MODE SCOPE, TPC AND TPL SHOULD ALSO BE INCLUDED.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-416
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-107
NASA FMEA #: 148-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
107
RESERVE H20 TANK (ITEM 148)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-417
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-724X
NASA FMEA #: 148-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
724
RESERVE WATER TANK (ITEM 148)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN C WHICH
THE IOA NOW CONCURS WITH THE NASA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-418
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-704X BASELINE [ ]
150-FMI NEW [ ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
704
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-419
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-466
NASA FMEA #: 150-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
466
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
(ALSO REFERENCE ASSESSMENT MDAC ID 458). THE IOA RECOMMENDS A
2/2 CRITICALITY DUE TO INABILITY TO ASCERTAIN VERACITY OF CWS.
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE NASA ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-420
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-467
NASA FMEA #: 150-FMII
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
467
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC a B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
(ALSO, REFERENCE ASSESSMENT MDAC ID 457). THE IOA AGREES WITH
THE NASA ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, NASA SHOULD PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC
CAUSES.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-421
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-711X
NASA FMEA #: 150-FMI2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
711
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-422
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-757X
NASA FMEA #: 150-FMI3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
757
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
Ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-423
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-758X
NASA FMEA #: 150-FMI4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
758
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NAsa EXCEPT A SCREEN B. BECAUSE C02
MONITORING IS NOT PERFORMED AT X=I, SECOND FAILURE OF C02 CONTROL
CAN RESULT IN UNDETECTED C02 INCREASES LEADING TO LOSS OF LIFE.
NO INDICATION OF THE X=I FAILURE IS PROVIDED THE CREWPERSON.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-424
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-705X
NASA FMEA #: 150-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
705
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA, HOWEVER, DOES
RECOMMEND THE CAUSE(S) BE MORE SPECIFIC.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-425
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-465
NASA FMEA #: 150-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
465
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA, HOWEVER, DOES
RECOMMEND THE CAUSE(S) BE MORE SPECIFIC.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-426
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-706X
NASA FMEA #: 150-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
706
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE IOA DOES
RECOMMEND THE NASA CAUSE(S) BE MORE SPECIFIC.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-427
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-707X
NASA FMEA #: 150-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
707
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE IOA DOES
RECOMMEND THE NASA CAUSE(S) BE MORE SPECIFIC.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-428
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-708X
NASA FMEA #: 150-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
708
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE IOA DOES
RECOMMEND THE NASA CAUSE(S) BE MORE SPECIFIC.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-429
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-709X
NASA FMEA #: 150-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
709
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE IOA DOES
RECOMMEND THE NASA CAUSE(S) BE MORE SPECIFIC.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-430
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-462
NASA FMEA #: 150-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
462
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE IOA DOES
RECOMMEND THE NASA CAUSE(S) BE MORE SPECIFIC.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-431
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-710X
NASA FMEA #: 150-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
710
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR TO REFLECT POSSIBLE CPU FAILURE
COMBINING WITH AN EMU FAILURE (E.G. CCC FAILS CO2 CONTROL) AND
CAUSING LOSS OF LIFE. HOWEVER, THE IOA ALSO NOW RECOMMENDS
PASSAGE OF SCREEN B DUE TO THE AVAILABILITY OF THE BITE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-432
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-726X
NASA FMEA #: 161-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
726
PLSS/SOP TMG (ITEM 161)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA IS CONCERNED THAT LOCAL HOT SPOTS CAN RESULT ON PLSS OR
SOP BOTTLES IF HEAT IS NOT EFFICIENTLY CONDUCTED. IF THIS
RESULTS THE OXYGEN BOTTLES COULD RUPTURE VIOLENTLY AND CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-433
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-191
NASA FMEA #: 170-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
191
MUFFLER (ITEM 170)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-434
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-169
NASA FMEA #: 171-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
169
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 171)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [F] [P]
[P] [F] IF]
IX]*
[X]
COMPARE [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-435
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-171
NASA FMEA #: 171-FMI
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
171
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 171)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] IF]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-436
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-168
NASA FMEA #: 171-FM2, FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
168
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 171)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT AND IS IN
AGREEMENT WITH THE REMAINING ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-437
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-170
NASA FMEA #: 171-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
170
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 171)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[P] IF] [P]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA HARDWARE CRITICALITY; HOWEVER, THE
IOA DISAGREES WITH THE FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY. THE FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY SHOULD BE AIR WHEN REDUNDANT FUNCTION FAILURES ARE
CONSIDERED. THESE REDUNDANT FUNCTIONS MAY BE REVIEWED DUE TO
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION FROM DECREASE IN AVAILABLE BATTERY
POWER RESERVE. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF BATTERY TIME REMAINING
MESSAGE THE IOA NOW RECOMMENDS PASSAGE OF SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-438
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-167
NASA FMEA #: 171-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
167
H20 SHUTOFFVALVE (ITEM 171)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-439
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-172
NASA FMEA #: 171-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
172
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 171)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADWDELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA DIFFER REGARDING FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY.
BECAUSE THE BATTERY MAY BE DRAINED AT A GREATER THAN NORMAL RATE
30 MINUTES NOTICE MAY BE TOO LITTLE AND SOP USAGE MAY RESULT.
LOSS OF THE SOP CAN THEREFORE RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS. THE
IOARECOMMENDS A 3/IR CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-440
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-174
NASA FMEA #: 172-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
174
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 172)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[ P ]
[N]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FINDINGS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-441
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-176
NASA FMEA #: 172-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
176
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 172)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FINDINGS.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-442
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
EMU-173
172-FM3
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
173
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 172)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-443
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-727X
NASA FMEA #: 174-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
727
REAL TIME DATA SYSTEM (ITEM 174)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C "
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-728X
NASA FMEA #: 174-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
728
REAL TIME DATA SYSTEM
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. ALSO, THE IOA DOES
RECOMMEND THE NASA PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC CAUSES. THE IOA
RECOMMENDS THE NASA ANALYSIS ENCOMPASS SHORTS PRIOR TO THE
LIMITING RESISTOR FOR THE WORST CASE WHICH CAN RESULT IN A 2/IR
WITH LOSS
OF REDUNDANT FUNCTIONS (C&W, CCC, AND/OR SOP).
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-445
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-322
NASA FMEA #: 200-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
322
SOP ASSEMBLY (ITEM 200)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY DUE TO THE FAILURE NOT
BEING WHOLELY WITHIN THE SOP. THE FAILURE WOULD FIRST RESULT IN
IMPACT TO THE PLSS AND NOT THE SOP. LOSS OF THE PLSS WOULD THEN
REQUIRE A CONCURRENT LOSS OF THE SOP MAKEUP CAPABILITY TO CAUSE
LOSS OF LIFE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-446
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-295A
NASA FMEA #: 200-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
295
SECONARY OXYGEN BOTTLE (ITEM 210)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS. HOWEVER, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS ADDITION OF SEAL FAILURE AS A CAUSE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-447
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-295
NASA FMEA #: 210-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
295
SECONARY OXYGEN BOTTLE (ITEM 210)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-448
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
EMU-296
210-FM2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
296
SECONARY OXYGEN BOTTLE (ITEM 210)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ F ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-449
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-307
NASA FMEA #: 213B-FMI
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
307
IST STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT ON THE ANALYSIS AND
CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-450
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-305
NASA FMEA #: 213B-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
305
IST STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
('ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE I/i CRITICALITY DUE TO THE SOP BEING AN
EMERGENCY SYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-451
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/i0/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-306
NASA FMEA #: 213B-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
306
IST STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE I/i CRITICALITY DUE TO THE SOP BEING AN
EMERGENCY SYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-452
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-303
NASA FMEA #: 213B-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
303
IST STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-453
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-302
NASA FMEA #: 213B-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
302
IST STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE I/I CRITICALITY DUE TO THE SOP BEING AN
EMERGENCY SYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-454
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-729X
NASA FMEA #: 213B-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
729
FIRST STAGE REGULATOR(ITEM 213B)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-455
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/i0/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-309
NASA FMEA #: 213D-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
309
2ND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC a B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE i/i CRITICALITY DUE TO THE SOP BEING AN
EMERGENCY SYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-456
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-313
NASA FMEA #: 213D-FMIO
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
313
2ND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-457
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-310
NASA FMEA #: 213D-FM2, FM3, FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
310
2ND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE i/I CRITICALITY DUE TO THE SOP BEING AN
EMERGENCY SYSTEM. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING THE
THREE NASA FAILURE MODES INTO ONE DUE TO ALL THREE FAILURE MODES
BEING THE SAME EXCEPT FOR LIMITATION ON THE FAILURE IN
213D-FM2 AND 213D-FM3.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-458
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-311
NASA FMEA #: 213D-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
311
2ND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE i/i CRITICALITY DUE TO THE SOP BEING AN
EMERGENCY SYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-459
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-312
NASA FMEA #: 213D-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM-.
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
312
2ND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE I/i CRITICALITY DUE TO THE SOP BEING AN
EMERGENCY SYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-460
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-308
NASA FMEA #: 213D-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
308
2ND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE i/i CRITICALITY DUE TO THE SOP BEING AN
EMERGENCY SYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-461
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-730X
NASA FMEA #: 213D-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
730
SECOND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-462
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
EMU-312A
213D-FM9
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
EMU
312
2ND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
UPON FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-463
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-317
NASA FMEA #: 213E-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
317
SOP PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 213E)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-464
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/i0/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
EMU-316
213E-FM2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
316
SOP PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 213E)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-465
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-314
NASA FMEA #: 213E-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
314
SOP PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 213E)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE i/i CRITICALITY DUE TO THE SOP BEING AN
EMERGENCY SYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-466
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-315
NASA FMEA #: 213E-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
315
SOP PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 213E)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-467
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-318
NASA FMEA #: 213F-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
318
SOP FILL PORT QD AND FILTER (ITEM 213F)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ i /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGP_ES WITH THE I/i CRITICALITY DUE TO THE SOP BEING AN
EMERGENCY SYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-468
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-301
NASA FMEA #: 215-FMI, FM7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EMU
301
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (ITEM 215)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[p] [P] [P]
C ] C ] C ]
[ x] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT REGARDING FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY. A LOW READING (OR LOSS OF OUTPUT) FOR THE PRESSURE
TRANSDUCER WILL NOT RESULT IN PERFORMANCE LOSS OF THE SOP BUT IT
WILL INCREASE THE URGENCY OF RETURN TO THE ORBITER AIRLOCK.
AS SUCH, ONLY ADDITIONAL FAILURES WHICH ARE THEMSELVES LIFE
CRITICAL (E.G. EXTERNAL LEAKAGE) CAN RESULT IN A 2/IR AND SHOULD
BE KEPT SEPARATE. THE IOA THEREFORE RECOMMENDS A 2/2
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-469
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-300
NASA FMEA #: 215-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
300
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (ITEM 215)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS BECAUSE THIS FAILURE MODE
CAN POSSIBLY MASK OTHER SYSTEM FAILURES UNDER THE GUISE OF
ACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-470
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ i /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-297
215-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
297
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (ITEM 215)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE i/i CRITICALITY DUE TO THE SOP BEING AN
EMERGENCY SYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-471
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-298
NASA FMEA #: 215-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
298
PRESSURETRANSDUCER(ITEM 215)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /1 ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-472
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU-298A
215-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
EMU
298
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (ITEM 215)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] IN] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT; HOWEVER, THE IOA
CONCURS WITH THE SEPARATION OF FAILURE MODES (FM4 VS. FM5) TO BE
MORE SPECIFIC. BECAUSE A FAILURE OF THE PRESSURE SENSITIVE
INTERFACE HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BE VIOLENT WITH A RESULTANT OXYGEN
FIRE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A i/I CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-473
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-299
NASA FMEA #: 215-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
299
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (ITEM 215)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR SCREEN
B. THE IOA NOW AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA IS IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE FAILURE
SCENARIO DEFINED BY THE NASA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-474
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-508
300-FMI
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
EMU
508
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-475
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-505
NASA FMEA #: 300-FM2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
505
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (115)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
E ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-476
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-760X
NASA FMEA #: 300-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
760
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE FAILURE MODE IS
NOT DETECTABLE AND DOESN'T HAVE AUTOMATIC BACKUP FOR THE REQUIRED
FUNCTION. THE IOA THEREFORE RECOMMENDS INCLUSION IN THE CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-477
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-507
NASA FMEA #: 300-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
507
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/3 CRITICALITY DUE TO IOA UNDERSTANDING
THAT LEAK CHECK IS PERFORMED MANUALLY AS A NORM. THEREFORE NO
MISSION IMPACT SHOULD OCCUR.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-478
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/i0/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-504
NASA FMEA #: 300-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
504
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (115)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ANALYSES ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-479
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-506
NASA FMEA #: 300-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
506
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-480
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-503
NASA FMEA #: 300-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
503
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (115)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA DISAGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS BECAUSE OF THE
AVAILABILITY OF LEAK CHECK BOTH FROM AUTOMATIC (INTERNAL) AND
MANUAL CAPABILITIES.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-481
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
EMU-759X BASELINE [ ]
300-FM7 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 759
ITEM: DCM
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF THE ENTIRE NUMBER OF SCREWS FAILED BRACKET SEPARATION CAN
RESULT IN SUIT DEPRESSURIZATION AND LOSS OF LIFE. SCREEN A
SHOULD BE PASSED DUE TO CAPABILITY FOR CHECKOUT DURING GROUND
TURNAROUND. SCREEN C SHOULD BE FAILED TO REFLECT A COMMON CAUSE
FAILURE FOR THE SCREWS (E.G. IMPACT).
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-482
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
EMU-363
3 II-FMI, FM3
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
EMU
363
SUIT PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 311)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-483
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-362
NASA FMEA #: 311-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
362
SUIT PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 311)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-484
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
EMU-359
311-FM4
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
359
SUIT PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 311)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-485
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-365
NASA FMEA #: 314-FMI
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
365
DCM PURGE VALVE (ITEM 314)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[ NA]
[ F ]
[ N ]
C
[ P ]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-486
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
EMU-366
314-FMI
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
EMU
366
DCM PURGE VALVE (ITEM 314)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
C P ]
CP]
C ]
B
[ NA]
[ F ]
[ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-487
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-368
NASA FMEA #: 314-FMI
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
368
DCM PURGE VALVE (ITEM 314)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B
REGARDING WHICH THE IOA NOW AGREES WITH THE NASA.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-488
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-367
NASA FMEA #: 314-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
367
DCM PURGE VALVE (ITEM 314)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-489
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-364
314-FM3
EMU
364
DCM PURGE VALVE (ITEM 314)
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA WOULD RECOMMEND
ADDING INTERNAL LEAKAGE TO THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-490
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
EMU-501
321-FMI, FM2
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
501
COOLING CONTROL VALVE (ITEM 321)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-491
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-502
NASA FMEA #: 321-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
502
COOLING CONTROL VALVE (ITEM 321)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] CP]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-492
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EMU-500
321-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
500
COOLING CONTROL VALVE (ITEM 321)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH
THE REMAINING ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-493
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-369A
NASA FMEA #: 330-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
369
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/IR CRITICALITY TO REFLECT THE WORST CASE
MISSION SCENARIO. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING
330-FMI AND FM2.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-494
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU-375
330-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
EMU
375
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
Ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. CAUSES SHOULD BE EXPANDED
TO INCLUDE VIBRATION AND CORROSION.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-495
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-376
NASA FMEA #: 330-FMII
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
376
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BECAUSE NSTS 22206 PROHIBITS USE OF CONTINGENCY OR OFF-NOMINAL
PROCEDURES TO DOWNGRADE A CRITICALITY, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-496
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-377 BASELINE [ ]
330-FM12 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
377
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-497
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-383
NASA FMEA #: 330-FM13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
383
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS DUE TO GROUND RULES NOT
PERMITTING CONSIDERATION OF SECOND EMU/SCU AS REDUNDANT.
ADDITIONALLY, THE SPARE BATTERY IS NOT CONSIDERED REDUNDANT
EITHER.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-498
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-382
NASA FMEA #: 330-FM14
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
382
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-499
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-378
NASA FMEA #: 330-FM15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
378
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT AND IS IN
AGREEMENT WITH THE REMAINING ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 C-500
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